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Preface 
 
 
This thesis is the result of a year of research into the philosophical backgrounds of the 
design of our landscape. The main challenge was the integration of philosophical 
theories and ideas with concrete issues of environmental planning. My interest in both 
abstract theorising and concrete changes in the landscape led to a thesis that starts in 
the landscape, moves upwards to the high regions of philosophical abstraction, and 
descends back to earth in the end. 
 
My computer science background certainly helped in creating a coherent model of the 
involved concepts and their relations to one another. When one is designing a 
software system, the recognition of these concepts and relations is one of the most 
important tasks, and it determines the whole architecture of the system. The same 
happens in philosophy, although the tool that is developed does not operate as a 
software system here, but as a means for people to describe what is happening in our 
lives. 
 
I want to thank everyone that helped in some way making the writing of this thesis 
manageable, easier, or just fun. Family and friends have been a great support in times 
when I did not see how something concrete could emerge from all this thinking, and 
some have repeatedly reminded me of the worth of the intellectual task in itself. 
Special thanks to Iwan, who more than anyone seems to recognise the value of new 
ideas even if they are not so easy to keep standing for. Thanks also to Theo, whose 
enthusiasm made the hours I worked for the computer science department a pleasant 
change in the daily rhythm. 
 
Of course, this thesis would not have been possible with the co-operation and 
assistance of my supervisors, who considerably improved the quality of the work with 
their extensive comments. Last but not least, therefore, I want to thank Peter-Paul, 
Petran and Anton for their ideas, criticism and support. 
 
 
Enschede, August 2003 
 
 
Wolter Pieters 
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Chapter 1   
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Why would anyone try to apply philosophy to environmental planning? The changes 
that become visible in the landscape are after all the results of merely instrumental 
decisions? Of course, we will need some aesthetic elements in the landscape, but we 
can design those after we covered all necessary instrumental functions, and we can 
set some areas apart for aesthetic enjoyment. 
 
The design of our landscape is an issue that often raises debates. Especially the 
construction of new town districts, roads, airport runways and railways leads to 
extensive protests and disputes. Formal procedures may cause considerable delay to 
the projects. Recent examples in the Netherlands are the Betuwelijn (cargo railroad 
from Rotterdam to the German Ruhr area), the fifth runway at Schiphol airport, and 
the district Kernhem and A30 highway in the town of Ede. 
Even though it is probably impossible to prevent disputes about such issues, the 
question may be asked whether the current procedures for the design of the landscape 
are adequate with respect to the effects involved. Can we provide tools for analysis 
which include aspects that are currently missed, or that currently receive less attention 
than they deserve? 
In this thesis, we will try to show why a coherent philosophy of environmental 
planning is necessary. Therefore, we will have a look at both the history of landscape 
and the history of philosophy, and try to find clues for an analysis that makes the view 
outlined above – "merely instrumental decisions" – less obvious. 
 
Landscape 
 
In environmental planning, the landscape is usually designed by assigning functions 
to areas in the landscape: a division of space according to function. Criticism towards 
current practices of landscape design is often heard, but seldom with adequate 
argumentation. It rather takes the form of NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) arguments, 
aimed at preventing the assignment of unwanted functions to nearby areas, or a 
general anti-scientific attitude leading to rejection of all practices based on scientific 
analysis (return to the myths, return to Mother Earth). However, the presumptions of 
existing approaches, using the machine as a metaphor of the world by describing it in 
terms of mechanisms and functions, remain unchallenged. On the one hand, ad hoc 
arguments are not sufficient to present any real challenge, and on the other hand, 
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structural arguments against current approaches often implicitly use the same machine 
metaphor: the earth as spaceship earth1. 
The possibilities of criticism and the reconsideration of the presumptions of 
existing approaches will be shown by an analysis of the problem of fragmentation 
("versnippering") within environmental planning. The issue at stake is the 
dissatisfaction with the tendency to divide the landscape into smaller and smaller 
pieces. We will argue that a new approach in the design of the landscape can provide 
better solutions to problems occurring within environmental planning. This is done by 
focusing on the relations of people with the landscape rather than on functions in the 
analysis of the landscape. 
 
Agents in virtual environments 
 
Next to my ideas about philosophy, my roots in computer science also have had a 
large influence on this thesis. Especially some knowledge about the technology of 
virtual environments and virtual characters that inhabit such environments is essential 
for understanding the approach advanced in this text. The main issues on this subject 
will be explained in chapter 5. 
An important aspect of the research presented here is the paradigm of case-based 
reasoning in artificial intelligence. This paradigm relates to the philosophical concept 
of habits used in this thesis. Case-based reasoning as a paradigm was initiated by the 
article on its foundations by Aamodt and Plaza (1994). A standard work on artificial 
intelligence by Russell and Norvig (1995) therefore hardly even mentions it (the word 
case-based appears only once in the notes). I got acquainted with it during my 
internship in Trondheim, Norway (Pieters, 2001). After finishing the internship, I 
continued to work in case-based reasoning research for my master's thesis (Pieters, 
2002). It was then that I realised that case-based reasoning is truly a different 
paradigm because of the different assumptions that guide the reasoning. 
 
Related work 
 
The main themes of this research are related to work done by others on similar 
subjects. Especially the relation between nature and culture and the principles of 
phenomenological analysis are important. An analysis of the relation between our 
culture and the landscape is found in Lemaire (2002). The relation between nature and 
technology is the subject of the book 'Natuur tussen mythe en techniek' by Achterhuis 
(1995). An attempt to apply phenomenological analysis to architecture has been 
initiated by Norberg-Schulz (2000). Verbeek (2000) developed a modern 
phenomenological approach based on the idea that technologies can influence the 
 
1 Achterhuis (1995) gives an example of how a seemingly holistic approach in fact reduces holism to 
modern system theory (pp. 58-59). 
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relation between humans and their environment (mediation). Meijberg (2002) 
analysed the material conditions of public space from this perspective. 
 
Structure of this thesis 
 
The structure of this thesis is based on the idea that philosophical reasoning should 
start from concrete problems. By analysing a chosen issue, we will introduce 
philosophical issues about environmental planning. The main theme chosen in the 
second chapter is the issue of fragmentation ("versnippering"). The current approach 
to designing the landscape – leading to this problem – is described, and it is critically 
analysed from a philosophical perspective. It is argued that we will need to focus on 
relations between humans and their environment instead of the landscape as an 
objectified structure, to avoid the premises that produce the problem. The means 
introduced for describing these relations is the philosophical movement of 
phenomenology, introduced in chapter 3. 
The limitations of current phenomenological approaches justify an extension with 
concepts from a different philosophical movement: pragmatism or instrumentalism. 
Pragmatism is discussed in the fourth chapter. Thereafter, we will discuss in detail 
three different paradigms in artificial intelligence (chapter 5), serving as a heuristic 
tool for describing the different aspects of human-world relations. Combining the 
philosophical foundation with the AI paradigms yields a systematic approach to 
describing such relations, and how they are changed by interventions in the 
environment. This is done in discussion with the work of Christian Norberg-Schulz, 
who applied phenomenology to the art of architecture. The new approach and 
vocabulary will be presented in the sixth chapter. The last part of this thesis consists 
in applying the approach to concrete issues of environmental planning – the design of 
the landscape (chapter 7). 
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Chapter 2   
 
Landscape 
 
 
 
 
Ever since humans first settled down in fixed places instead of wandering around, the 
landscape around their settlements has been subject to human intervention. In 
nomadic life, the landscape has to be used "as is", because it is only utilised 
temporarily. When humans stayed in the same place for a prolonged period, things 
could be changed in order to yield results in the future. Changes could then 
accumulate to produce even better adapted environments. The practices of the group 
became interwoven with adaptations in the landscape. Whereas the planning effort 
was not formalised at first, explicit procedures were developed through the ages. 
 
In our time, explicit planning has become an integral part of the use of the landscape. 
Especially in the Netherlands, space has become so scarce that authorities have to 
make well-founded decisions in order to avoid conflicts. Without planning, the 
country would soon be a jumble of initiatives and battles. To be able to use the 
landscape, we have to design it in a way that makes various ways of use possible. This 
is the task of environmental planning. In environmental planning, areas in the 
landscape are assigned certain functions. The landscape can then be designed 
according to the function of the area. 
 
Although everyone without anarchistic tendencies is convinced that planning is 
necessary, not everyone seems to be satisfied with current practices. As a saying on 
immigration, the expression "the Netherlands are full" has been given a lot of 
attention, and as far as it has any racist connotations justly been condemned. But I do 
not believe that it applies only to questions of immigration. The sense of want of 
space is a more general issue signalling the incapability of people to cope with their 
fast-changing environment. This environment includes the landscape as well as the 
people. The goal of this project is to improve tools for analysing and evaluating 
environmental planning issues, such that the effects of interventions in the landscape 
can be better understood. First of all, we have to analyse the existing practice of 
thinking about the landscape and find out where things can be improved. To find 
alternatives to the current attitude, we have to look into the presuppositions that 
accompany this approach. This is where philosophy becomes relevant. 
 
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the possibilities of an alternative analysis of 
the landscape. By looking into current practices and evaluating these, we can establish 
a direction in which a new approach could and should be developed. These 
possibilities will be further investigated in the following chapters. 
 
A new approach of analysis makes it possible that aspects overlooked in current 
approaches can be taken into account in the design of the landscape, i.e. in 
environmental planning. In any design, the existing situation must be analysed to 
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assess the required or desired changes. By changing the methods of analysis, we can 
thus change practices of design. When we mention design issues, these should be read 
as indications of how aspects of analysis become visible in environmental planning. 
 
Landscape and its problems 
 
Environmental planning establishes the functions of areas in the landscape. In the 
Netherlands, the well-known word for a problem associated with the division of space 
according to function is "versnippering", which may be translated into 
"fragmentation". Because different functions are required in each region (e.g. housing, 
infrastructure, industry, recreation), areas with the same function tend to become 
smaller over time. The emphasis in the issue is on fragmentation of nature areas.  
 
Especially in large open areas, such as "de Veluwe" (the largest forest area) and "het 
Groene Hart" (an agricultural area in the centre of the Randstad city agglomeration), 
fragmentation is seen as a serious problem. The initiative of nature organisations and 
local authorities to work on an "endless Veluwe"2 exemplifies the tendency to tackle 
the problem. The goal of this initiative is the removal of barriers that hinder the 
movement of the fauna around the forest area, and the experience of the area as a 
whole by humans. Especially the corridors between the forest area and the rivers and 
lakes around it are in the picture as migrating routes for animals. However, this is also 
the part that has been urbanised extensively, and contains the most infrastructure. 
Traditionally, assigning the function of nature to areas that had a different function 
before was unthinkable, but this is changing. The local authorities of Renkum even 
agreed to abolish the industrial area Beukenlaan in the valley of the "Renkumse beek" 
to provide the wildlife of the Veluwe access to the Rhine3. Once separated areas are 
thus reconnected. 
 
The changing attitude is also visible when building new highways. The work on the 
new A50 between Eindhoven and Oss started in 2000, and is due to be finished in 
2005. 
 
'For the construction of the A50 highway some forest has to be removed. Besides, the A50 
has a disturbing effect on neighbouring forest, small-scale landscape, grassland and swamp. 
The A50 is also a barrier for mammals, amphibians, reptiles and butterflies living on both 
sides of the road. To compensate the damage to nature caused by the construction of the road, 
it has been agreed that Rijkswaterstaat [Dutch organisation responsible for highway 
construction and maintenance] is going to "build" nature. This job is very different from what 
Rijkswaterstaat has been used to! It implies that Rijkswaterstaat will buy 281 hectares of 
land, arrange it as "nature" and transfer it to terrain managers, where Rijkswaterstaat should 
guarantee the enduring preservation of the nature areas.' 4
 
 
2 http://www.gelderland.nl/veluwecommissie 
3 Volkskrant, 19 January 2002 and 25 February 2003 
   http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief 
4 http://www.aanlegA50.nl, my translation 
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The planning of this new highway thus is accompanied by the planning of new nature 
areas for compensating the negative effects of the road. Whereas in the early 70's the 
A1 highway was built straight through the Veluwe without any considerations about 
relieving consequences for nature and wildlife, even creating separated lanes with a 
central reservation of up to 40 metres5, insights have changed substantially since. 
Next to compensation, the planning of ecoducts and fauna tunnels has found its way 
into standard procedures in road construction. Fragmentation seems to be taken 
seriously. But what exactly is fragmentation? 
 
Fragmentation can be defined as the crumbling of spatial wholes over time (Ministerie 
voor de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 1997). Fragmentation is considered a complex 
problem. It occurs in several systems and at several levels. 
 
'The systems are:  
• morphological: fragmentation shows in design, in what is visible, e.g. buildings in an 
area of open space; 
• spatial-functional: fragmentation disturbs a whole, e.g. a farm consisting of separated 
parcels, leading to more relocations; 
• ecological: fragmentation breaches ecological processes or coherence, e.g. no connection 
between two similar nature areas. 
 
The levels are:  
• the landscape, e.g. cutting of an open area by roads;  
• between objects, e.g. scattered forests;  
• within objects, e.g. one nature area managed by various owners in different ways. 
 
[…] 
 
Fragmentation is only an environmental problem if it breaches a system important for 
biodiversity and coherence of the landscape (e.g. nature areas, landscapes), or if it leads to 
negative effects on the environment, e.g. scattered buildings with increased need for cables 
and increased traffic.' (my translation) 
 
 
Current solutions to fragmentation seem to focus on reconnection (defragmentation) 
of fragmented areas (Renkum valley), and compensation of the effects of 
fragmentation by interventions in nearby areas (A50 highway). A series of articles on 
the Veluwe in NRC Handelsblad also recognised these two principles6. 
Defragmentation may be implemented by an ecoduct, compensation for the 
broadening the A12 by providing an ecological corridor between the Veluwe and a 
neighbouring nature area. From a philosophical point of view, this raises the question 
what presuppositions such an approach contains. 
 
 
 
5 http://oud.refdag.nl/weet/981027weet01.html 
6 Hegener (1998) 
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Figure 2.1: The valley of the "Renkumse beek", on the left with industry, on the 
right without 
Source: Gedeputeerde Staten van Gelderland (2000), p. 48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of reconnection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Schematic representation of compensation 
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The solutions in terms of reconnection and compensation presuppose an analysis of 
the landscape in terms of functions. Functions may include for example housing, 
industry, infrastructure, recreation and nature. Different areas in the landscape are 
assigned different functions, and these functions are defined by models of economy, 
nature and human behaviour. These models are said to be based on scientific insights 
and therefore "objective": independent of subjective experience. By reconnection and 
compensation, functions may be re-assigned such that the division becomes more 
efficient. By the independence of the analysis from subjective experience, humans are 
placed outside of the landscape that is designed. For designers, this is of course a 
legitimate point of view. But designers easily forget other aspects of experiencing the 
landscape. "To exaggerate the importance of theoretical thought in society and history 
is a natural failing of theorizers."7
 
The outside perspective on the landscape is illustrated by the ratio of maps and graphs 
versus views "from the inside" in documents about national environmental planning 
in the Netherlands. Developments are illustrated by representations from above, either 
cartographic or from a bird's eye view. The analysis is based on considerations about 
how to divide space according to function, not on questions of how the landscape is 
experienced and acted upon. 
 
From this point of view, the solution in terms of reconnection and compensation is 
completely adequate. If some function of the landscape is hindered by fragmentation, 
we can either reconnect fragments such that the function can be recovered, or we can 
assign the function to different areas where fragmentation is less severe. If nature 
suffers from inaccessibility of the fertile river meadows to deer living on the sandy 
area of the Veluwe, we should provide connections. And if the quality of the 
landscape is negatively influenced by a new road, we should compensate for this 
elsewhere. 
 
7 Berger & Luckmann (1966), p. 15 
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Figure 2.4: Examples of objectification by cartographic representation 
Source: Ministerie van VROM (1997), p. 66 & Gedeputeerde Staten van 
Gelderland (2000), p. 124 
 
Figure 2.5: Example of inside perspective 
Source: Ministerie van VROM (1997), p. 97 
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However, an important aspect of fragmentation is not covered in this solution. The 
failure to establish a coherent landscape is not only condemned because of the aspects 
previously quoted, but also because of aspects involving human experience. Although 
seldom explicitly stated in these terms, criticism of fragmentation includes the 
experiential aspects as well as the spatial aspects of fragmentation, even if only by the 
example of hikers that find their routes blocked by fences or highways8 (picture front 
page). An example of an explicit indication of this aspect is found in Hegener (1998): 
 
'Relatively cheap, and […] urgent, is a set of measures to make the Veluwe into one area in 
the experience of the visitor.' (my translation, my italics) 
 
What is missing in the quoted description is the kind of fragmentation that occurs 
within human experience. Humans seem to have a desire for integrated experience 
rather than just rationally performing the functions that are associated with the 
environment they find themselves in9. Continuity is an important requirement for 
such experience. However, the division of space according to function seems to 
hinder this by introducing discontinuities in the landscape. Even when every function 
seems to be covered, the landscape may still have lost its coherence in human 
experience. 
 
The problem of fragmentation in environmental planning seems to have two sides. 
First, the physical fragmentation in the landscape, and second, the fragmentation in 
human experience. Norberg-Schulz (2000) speaks in the latter context of 'the loss of 
place', a sense of discomfort with the environment. Although the term 'loss of place' 
suggests more than just a problem, and may have a too negative connotation, it makes 
clear that fragmentation is a problem of experience as well as a problem of the 
landscape. If we want to treat these problems separately, we will first have to analyse 
the "objective" fragmentation, and then the "subjective" fragmentation. But why are 
these two different? Is there an "objective" kind of fragmentation apart from human 
experience? What are the causes of fragmentation? And how can we improve 
planning to increase coherence in the landscape? 
 
In order to answer these questions, we have to find out how fragmentation is currently 
analysed, if this analysis suffices, and if we can provide a better analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 See 'Op naar een eindeloze Veluwe', in: Natuurbehoud, May 2000. 
9 See e.g. Berger & Luckmann (1966) on habitualisation and institutionalisation, p. 50 and further 
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Current interpretations of fragmentation 
 
Fragmentation can be seen as an indication that there is something wrong with current 
approaches of landscape design10. Since fragmentation causes the problems quoted 
before (morphological, spatial-functional and ecological), current practices should be 
changed such that fragmentation can be prevented. 
 
When fragmentation is seen as an issue that can be tackled within the boundaries of 
current policy, a possible solution to the problem is to initiate special committees that 
take the responsibility of resolving fragmentation and improving the quality of the 
landscape in a certain region. An example of such a committee is the 
"Veluwecommissie" of the province of Gelderland11. The committee can advise local 
and provincial authorities and make plans for implementing measures to reduce 
fragmentation. One such measure was the abolishment of the industrial area in 
Renkum mentioned before. 
Another possible solution to the problem of fragmentation is to re-design the 
environmental planning policy such that areas with the same function are put near 
each other. This is for example the case in the perspective for the future of the 
Netherlands called "Stedenland" (City Land, see Ministerie van Vrom, 1997(b)), 
which tries to separate urban and rural areas. The exchange of functions between 
areas can lead to more diversity between urban and rural regions, and to better 
economic perspectives due to concentration of functions. 
 
However, the presumptions that lie behind the existing ideas are not challenged by 
these initiatives. Both by initiating committees and by changing the national policy, 
fragmentation is not seen as a real challenge to the understanding of the landscape. 
Instead, it is said that the spatial separation of functions provides an additional quality 
with respect to existing views. The issue of fragmentation within human experience is 
not discussed, and this is not by accident. It is not possible to discuss this aspect of the 
problem within the current interpretation of the landscape, since it is not included in 
the objective characteristics of the landscape that can be analysed. Rather, it must be 
considered a subjective problem that each human being has to solve for himself. 
 
Philosophy can provide a new understanding of the issue at stake in such situations. 
Whether or not a new way of interpretation will be accepted by authorities shortly is a 
matter of willingness to change habits of thinking, and this does not in any way 
influence the necessity of analysing the issue from a philosophical perspective. The 
question is whether there is a way of analysing the landscape so that rehabilitation of 
the landscape as integrated environment of human activities is more than a cut-and-
paste of elements in the landscape. By changing methods of analysis, the design 
process may be improved so that it can involve more than just rearranging elements. 
 
10 See e.g. Poppe, Remi, "Nota ruimtelijke ordening doet niets tegen versnippering", in: Haagse 
Courant, 12 januari 2001, http://www.sp.nl/partij/theorie/opinies/opinie132.stm. 
11 http://www.gelderland.nl/veluwecommissie 
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In order to investigate the possibilities of a new way of analysis, we will have a look 
at current criticism on environmental policy practices. We will assess the value of 
current criticism on the existing practices and see what it yields for our project. 
Current criticism on environmental policy 
 
Humans only relatively recently realised that there are limits to the exploitation of 
their environment. When they did, protests against over-exploitation were set up and 
an environmental movement formed. In the last decades, after threats like phosphates 
in washing powder, emission of cars and the like had been more or less successfully 
attacked, the attention also turned towards the landscape and its qualities. Planned 
changes in the landscape now have to meet serious objections before they can be 
implemented. But how are these objections legitimated? 
 
People concerned about environmental problems have been keen on blaming cultural 
developments. Nature or landscape as human environment is said to have been 
replaced by landscape as objectified space – or, to state it more dramatically, Mother 
Earth has been sacrificed to spaceship earth (Achterhuis, 1995) – and therefore we fail 
to take good care of the environment. It is easy to see that these problems may lead to 
a diagnosis of alienation, preferredly including overly critical analyses of science and 
technology, which are blamed for the objectification of the environment. But, as 
Achterhuis notices, criticism on the development towards spaceship earth often tends 
to strengthen this development instead of offering substantial alternatives, because it 
uses the same "language game" and the same system theoretic approach, e.g. by 
redefining the "functions" of managing the earth. We can increase the importance of 
the function "nature" by referring to the intrinsic values of nature, but this does not 
change the general attitude towards the problem in terms of functions. Moreover, such 
criticism often lacks systematic argumentation, and rather seems to be based on 
prejudices of a religious kind (e.g. New Age), often with anti-scientific connotations. 
This leads us to the question what alternatives can be offered to such a point of 
departure. 
 
The main reason that criticism on the current practices often fails, is that it lacks 
historical understanding. The scientific attitude – supposedly leading to objectification 
of the environment, or worse: the environment as stock of resources – is sketched as 
something radically opposed to earlier worldviews, and the critics try to re-establish 
such a worldview by suggesting a different emphasis. But the causes of objectification 
cannot directly be assigned to the evolution of modern science and technology. This is 
a typical case of assuming a causal relation between two developments that 
accompany each other. Such developments are not necessarily connected by a causal 
relation, since other factors may have a role in their development as well. 
Typically, the two developments (the evolution of science and objectification) may 
have a common cause instead of being directly related. In the case of the 
objectification of space, cultural developments already pointed in the direction of 
objectification even before the emergence of modern science. It can be shown that 
both the objectifying attitude and the emergence of modern science are connected to 
 16
A pragmatic phenomenological approach in environmental planning 
 
 
                                                
the development of the idea of the human being as a spectator of the world. 
Understanding the implications of the involved relations enables a critique of current 
approaches without an anti-scientific connotation. The aforementioned connections 
have been analysed by Ton Lemaire12. 
The cultural origins of the landscape 
 
Lemaire (2002) describes the role of the landscape in the art of painting. According to 
Lemaire, a painted landscape is 'the depicted connection between nature and culture, 
such that culture is subordinated to nature'13. The characteristics of the depiction of 
the landscape in art correspond to the cultural dimension of the relation between 
humans and the landscape. When in a culture a landscape is shown in a certain way in 
art, this reflects the general attitude towards nature and landscape in such a culture. 
 
The landscape does not appear within western culture before the Renaissance, when 
the inward direction of Christian contemplation transforms into an outward direction 
towards the landscape. The appearance of the landscape thereby initiates the 
disappearance of the Christian life-form. Lemaire distinguishes five phases of 
development of this depiction within western culture. 
The first phase is the opening and exploration of the earthly space. This is achieved 
by a simultaneous appearance of both the autonomous subject and the autonomous 
space. The autonomous view of experience, illustrated by the application in art of a 
linear perspective with the human self in the centre, subjectifies the human as 
spectator and at the same time objectifies the world. This causes a drifting apart of 
man and environment, in the sense that their relationship becomes more distant. 
Technical developments may have played a main part as mediators in this cultural 
transformation (Kockelkoren, 2001). 
In the second phase, settlement in the newly opened space takes place. Piety is now 
directed towards nature instead of God, and realism becomes dominant. Man is still 
dependent on nature. Nature has not yet been transformed into a resource for human 
use. There is not yet a distinction between physical nature and superior nature. 
This, however, changes in the third phase, the Romantic period. The process of 
subjectifying the human self now finds its consequence in loneliness. Nature has been 
divided into the true nature of science, which can be used for human purposes, and the 
beautiful nature of aesthetics. Mysticism discovers nature as a source of mystical 
experience; the striving for a mystical unification of the individual and nature begins. 
In the landscape, nature and culture find each other at the smallest possible distance. 
The theory of evolution as presented by Darwin diminishes the distinction of 
nature and culture that was so characteristic of the Romantic period. Culture is now 
proven subordinate to nature. Dignity is no longer sought in the superior and the 
special. Naturalism acknowledges the fact that the entire earthly space has become 
picturesque. This 'publication' of the world is strongly connected to the invention of 
photography. Photography completes the legitimisation of the linear perspective, and 
 
12 Lemaire's analysis is based on the landscape. In psychology, the relation between science and 
objectification has been analysed by De Boer (1980). 
13 p. 72, my translation 
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thereby the constitution of the autonomous subject of the Renaissance. Physical nature 
now dominates superior nature. 
However, the relativity of points of view is clearly found in both photography and 
the intentionally subjective art of impressionism. The fifth phase tried to overcome 
this perspectivism by searching for the hidden dimension of things. Attention moved 
from the conscious to the subconscious in the search for a definitive standpoint that 
could conquer relativism. 
 
What do we learn from all this? Firstly, that despite the fifth phase, physical nature 
still seems to be dominant in our culture. The focus is on the landscape as a system of 
objects and functions, clearly related to a spectator view. The division of space 
according to function in combination with the outside perspective taken in documents 
about environmental planning illustrates this point. Physical nature and aesthetic 
nature are still separated, and solutions to the problem of fragmentation refer to 
physical nature only (reconnection and compensation), since aesthetic characteristics 
are "subjective": they are part of the spectator, not of the landscape itself. 
The aspect of human experience of the landscape is thus missing in the design 
process. We will call this attitude – taking a phrase from John Dewey, whom we will 
meet in a following chapter – the spectator conception of experience. The 
developments that tried to challenge that status quo have mainly been occupied with 
re-establishing a hidden dimension in the physical world, i.e. adding some "forgotten" 
things or functions to the world of objects as presented by the sciences, e.g. by 
referring to intrinsic values of nature. However, the spectator conception – the 
equivalent of spaceship earth, where the environment is objectified – is rather 
reinforced than challenged by these attempts. 
 
Secondly, we learn that the separation of man and nature already started with the 
autonomisation of subjects and objects in the Renaissance, when the linear 
perspective placed the human as a spectator outside the landscape. It was not modern 
science that made the human being a spectator and "alienated" him from his 
environment. This process had already started centuries before modern science 
appeared on the scene. Subjectification and objectification are not the result of the 
scientific perspective, but rather one of the ingredients; an ingredient that has to be 
recognised if we aim to understand the relation between people and the landscape. If 
we search for alternatives to the current practices in environmental planning by 
avoiding objectification, the solution is not found in rejecting the scientific way of 
relating to the environment, only to find ourselves stuck in a different kind of 
objectification, a different kind of pigeon-holing14. 
 
Lemaire explains the background of the objectifying attitude by referring to historical 
cultural developments. The emphasis on necessity that science and philosophy seem 
to advance is challenged; instead, the development of our worldview is considered 
related to contingent worldly conditions. It might as well have been different. The 
consequence of this analysis, which I agree with on this issue, is that criticism on the 
current attitude should first and foremost check its premises against the premises that 
built the existing views. If one uses the same assumptions, it is quite hard to reach 
 
14 The campaign 'Denk ruimer dan in hokjes' initiated by SIRE (a Dutch organisation for non-
commercial advertising) tries to prevent people from pigeon-holing each other; we may as well argue 
for a campaign to avoid pigeon-holing the landscape. 
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different conclusions. If one wants to offer a real alternative, one has to look at the 
assumptions that lie behind current views and critically analyse those. 
Since objectification is not the result of science, environmental problems are not 
solved by blaming the scientific attitude. Neither are they solved by suggesting 
different ways of analysing the objects by including "hidden" elements (e.g. intrinsic 
values) within the system theoretic approach of functions and objects. If we want to 
prevent objectification from being the sole source of understanding, the resulting 
division of space according to function, and its consequences in fragmentation, we 
have to avoid the premises that lead to objectification.  
 
Subjectification and objectification are interrelated by a focus on the human being as 
a spectator of the world. If we want to find a truly new way of analysing issues of 
environmental planning, we have to challenge this assumption. The problem of 
fragmentation, both in the landscape and in human experience, cannot be adequately 
dealt with if we separate the "subjective" impressions from the "objective" landscape. 
In that case, we treat the landscape by cutting and pasting elements, and we treat 
experience by therapy or medication for the spectator. Both aspects are then 
completely separated, and the subjective aspect is not considered a problem of 
environmental planning. 
 
We have to reconsider the spectator conception if we want to present an integrated 
perspective. We will therefore investigate the various developments that offered a 
challenge to this presumption. 
 
The subject-object distinction 
 
The spectator conception of experience is connected to the distinction between 
subjects and objects – or man and nature – in philosophy. Until the end of the 19th 
century, it was nearly impossible to think that man was continuous with nature, i.e. 
not a somehow super-natural being. The philosophy of Descartes exemplifies the 
extreme version of this distinction. In all philosophies, man was the observer of the 
world. Nearly all philosophical theories assumed that mind could exist apart from the 
world. 
It is hard to overestimate the consequences that Darwin's theory of evolution and 
the ideas that built further on this basis must have had for the existing worldviews. 
Suddenly, it became likely that man was continuous with other existences after all. 
However, few thinkers have referred to Darwin as a turning point and built a truly 
new philosophy from the new insights. The implications of the Darwinian point of 
view are quite profound: the inquiring attitude that accompanies science is no longer 
explained by referring to the human as a spectator, but as an organism that interacts 
with its environment and tries to sustain and evolve life by securing utilisation of its 
environment. 
This view has been adopted by various philosophers. Even though all these people 
argued for a different approach, things do not seem to have changed that much in 
practice. How come? It seems that in our culture, the questions that are asked in 
design still largely are based on approaches that explicitly or implicitly assume a 
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distinction between man and nature, related to a spectator conception of experience. 
Objective or physical aspects of the environment are thereby separated from 
subjective or aesthetic aspects. This premise is so interwoven with cultural practices 
that only a comprehensive alternative that is able to explain developments from a 
different perspective can lead to changes in practice. 
 
There are some philosophical theories that use quite different presumptions. These 
approaches all challenge the subject-object distinction in some way. Some are worth 
mentioning here. Bruno Latour advanced a theory that eliminates the terms subject 
and object altogether: the actor-network theory. He rather speaks of "actants" instead 
of distinguishing humans and objects. Both humans and things have power to act, and 
they can do so by forming networks. The acting programmes that the connected 
actants have determine what action should take place.  
A movement that takes a different starting point is phenomenology. Although 
originally founded as a movement for understanding knowledge by the directedness 
of consciousness towards logical content, phenomenology developed in the direction 
of a comprehensive method for analysing relations between humans and the world. 
Human beings are understood as directed towards their environment. At first, the 
directedness was described as the directedness of a pre-existing subject towards its 
world, but recent developments show that subject and object can be thought of as 
mutually constituted. Moreover, the emphasis is on the relation rather than on subjects 
and objects as separate entities. This partly avoids the implications of the subject-
object distinction, but phenomenology does not eliminate the terms in its analysis. 
Latour criticises phenomenology for re-creating the gap between subject and 
object. However, Latour does not offer the means to analyse relations by the 
directedness of existences towards the world, but rather presents an "overview" over 
the connected actants, from the outside perspective of an analyst. This implies the 
danger that instead of abolishing the subject-object distinction, everything is now 
explained in terms of objects, and thereby subjective characteristics may be 
eliminated altogether. Since phenomenology avoids this hazard by focusing on 
relations, it is a more suitable starting point for our analysis. 
 
We aim to develop an approach that does not separate subjective and objective 
aspects of our relation to our environment. This enables a discussion of fragmentation 
that includes both "subjective" and "objective" aspects, instead of the current 
discussion in terms of the "objective" solutions of reconnection and compensation, 
which does not include issues of human experience. Such an approach should focus 
on the relations between existences from an inside perspective, instead of an outside 
perspective on the world as a system of objects and functions. The starting point is the 
phenomenological movement in philosophy. In the next chapter, the possibilities and 
limitations of applying phenomenological thought to environmental planning will be 
investigated. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we provided a reconstruction of the concept of fragmentation in 
environmental planning. Instead of considering fragmentation as an objective problem 
of the landscape only, it was argued that fragmentation is a problem within human 
experience as well. To make possible an approach that takes this aspect into account, 
we critically analysed the presuppositions of existing approaches. 
 
Discussions about the design of the landscape until recently focused on the landscape 
as a system of functions, being the object of scientific analysis by a human spectator, 
rather than on interaction between humans and landscape. The most important 
presupposition of the division of space according to function is a spectator conception 
of experience, which is not so much based on common sense or rational deliberation, 
but on a cultural development – as we have seen in the analysis of Lemaire. From this 
point of view, the current tackling of the problem of fragmentation by reconnection 
and compensation is adequate. It deals with the objective fragmentation of the 
landscape by reconnection and compensation; the subjective fragmentation in human 
experience cannot be understood as a problem of environmental planning, and is 
therefore irrelevant. 
 
The observation that fragmentation of the landscape and fragmentation in human 
experience are different issues stems from a subject-object distinction. But from the 
perspective that human beings should be understood in interaction with their 
environment – or, in phenomenological terms, that subject and object are mutually 
constituted – the world does not exist as a system of objects apart from human 
experience. We have to structure our experience ourselves; structures only emerge in 
our interaction with the world. The fragmentation in the landscape and the 
fragmentation in human experience are two aspects of the same phenomenon. An 
approach that wants to provide better tools for analysis and planning should focus on 
the interaction of man and landscape instead of the landscape as objectified 
environment. 
 
Western philosophy has shown a great interest in providing foundations for science or 
knowledge in general, and this may explain the emphasis on the well-structured, 
rational observation of the world by a human subject. We would rather argue that 
intellectual thought stems from practical activity, from concrete urgencies in the 
relation between people and their environment15. Already, more and more people 
argue for focusing on 'experiencing' or 'reading' the landscape in the analysis leading 
to design. This may provide an alternative to design based on functions. Some of their 
insights have actually been implemented (e.g. region-specific building, which tries to 
 
15 As in the philosophy of John Dewey. 
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take experience into account by a design that is continuous with existing experience 
of the region). 
 
In this thesis, we aim to provide a systematic approach for describing the way in 
which the landscape is experienced and acted upon, without using the spectator 
conception of experience as a presupposition. Thereby the objectification of the 
landscape is avoided, enabling the discussion of different ways in which humans can 
relate to the landscape. We will show from a philosophical point of view that the 
scientific, subject-object, spectator way of relating to the world is not the only way, 
and argue that environmental planning should also pay attention to other ways in 
which people have relations with the environment. This approach can be used to 
analyse and direct new developments in environmental planning based on a 
comprehensive framework. 
 
The approach developed in this thesis is based on the philosophical movement of 
phenomenology. Phenomenology rejects thinking in terms of subjects and objects as 
separate things, and focuses on their relation. We have already mentioned that 
phenomenology avoids the danger of eliminating all subjective characteristics, as 
present in other attempts to avoid the subject-object distinction (e.g. actor-network 
theory). We will give an overview over phenomenological thought in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3   
 
Phenomenology 
 
 
 
 
An approach in philosophy that may be helpful in re-integrating humans and the 
objectified environment is phenomenology. Phenomenology started as a philosophical 
movement for analysing knowledge starting from the relation between consciousness 
and its contents. According to phenomenology, consciousness is always 
consciousness of something; it is directed. We will see how this leads to a modern 
approach that focuses on the relation between humans and their world. 
 
Classical phenomenology 
Husserl: intentionality and lifeworld 
 
The core concept of phenomenology is the concept of intentionality as introduced by 
Brentano and adapted by Husserl to fit the phenomenological method. Brentano used 
the concept to distinguish between physical (non-psychical) and psychical 
phenomena. According to Brentano, psychical phenomena are characterised by the 
directedness towards an object16. Phenomenology used this concept to provide an 
analysis of consciousness. The main characteristic of classical phenomenology is the 
understanding of consciousness as directed towards phenomena. An understanding of 
the analysis that classical phenomenology gives of consciousness is indispensable for 
grasping the relevance of modern phenomenological analysis. 
 
Husserl moved away from a psychological description of meaning, and tried to 
describe the activity of consciousness as a logical or transcendental activity instead of 
a psychical process. The directedness of this activity is not towards physical objects or 
psychical representations of such objects, but towards phenomena in consciousness. 
These phenomena are actively constituted by consciousness in the process of 
apperception. Consciousness is not merely passive registration of external objects, but 
it is actively involved in creating its objects17. 
Husserl's phenomenological reduction serves as a tool for giving up knowledge 
that is connected to empirical facts, knowledge that is acquired by man's natural 
attitude. In this way, we focus on what is logically necessary instead of on the 
existence of an external natural world. We can only analyse how phenomena appear 
 
16 Van Peursen (1968), pp. 17 and further. 
17 Van Peursen (1968), pp. 26 and further. 
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within the logical activity of consciousness, and we should therefore postpone 
judgements about the existence of such a world and its structure. 
 
Later, Husserl realised that it is not the knowledge connected to empirical facts that 
we should give up, but the whole idea that there is a reality behind the phenomena. 
This is Husserl's turn towards idealism. This transcendental reduction is connected to 
the acknowledgement of a lifeworld, which is primary to the scientific models that are 
thrown over reality as a cloth of ideas. Hereby, the traditional notion of a real reality 
behind the appearances is discarded: the lifeworld and its qualities and practices are 
not just appearances derived from the real objects science describes, but they are 
themselves indispensable for any scientific knowledge whatsoever. Since science is 
built from the lifeworld, science does not describe a reality "behind" the phenomena. 
This is the point of the transcendental reduction. 
 
This shift in Husserl's thinking may be compared to the transition of Wittgenstein's 
ideas between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations. Here, the shift is 
from the foundation of language by logical structures towards the foundation of 
logical structures by language. Natural language may be seen as the linguistic 
component of the lifeworld, as well as formal logic may be seen as the linguistic 
component of science. Wittgenstein therefore acquired the same transition as Husserl 
for the science of language. However, Wittgenstein never acknowledged a 
transcendental subjectivity as Husserl did. 
According to Van Peursen (1968), there are more common characteristics in 
phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Both approaches were dissatisfied with the 
results of speculative philosophy. Both emphasised the model-character of 
knowledge: the value of knowledge is related to its connections to other aspects of life 
from which the knowledge emerged in the first place. In the same sense, facts become 
related to the values that characterise the praxis of life instead of being necessarily 
given. Both approaches describe daily reality as inexhaustible; different models may 
be used to describe it depending on pragmatic considerations. These common 
characteristics partly establish a link between phenomenology and pragmatism. The 
connection will be described in more detail later. 
 
Husserl's idealistic version of phenomenology does not result in a completely new 
position in philosophy. Although the focus is different from what other philosophers 
emphasised before, the human being is still placed outside of the world as an "ego". 
The inheritance of the spectator philosophies that formed the basis of the discussion 
from which Husserl took his materials is still visible in his own approach in the shape 
of the transcendental subject. This is not to say that the importance of Husserl's work 
should in any way be denied, but it illustrates that the development had not yet been 
completed. 
Although the transcendental, idealistic version of phenomenology can be seen as 
the ultimate culmination of the spectator perspective, its similarities to pragmatism 
slowly induced a shift towards a more pragmatic version. In the later phases of his 
thinking, Husserl already decreased the prominence of the spectator position by 
introducing his lifeworld philosophy. Thereby, the concrete practices of human beings 
entered into phenomenology. However, Husserl never gave up the transcendental 
position. 
The tendency towards a more pragmatic version made it possible to overcome the 
transcendental approach in phenomenology, and use the results of phenomenological 
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analysis as instruments of analysis in a context where the focus was on practices of 
inquiry and social behaviour rather than on the subject as a spectator. Attempts in this 
direction were initiated by Schütz (Kockelkoren, 1980) and Berger & Luckmann 
(1966). Both were inspired by phenomenology as a possibility of understanding the 
social aspects of human life in a new way. This means that they had to investigate the 
possibilities of intersubjectivity: the understanding of fellow humans and the sharing 
of meaning. 
 
The question of intersubjectivity turned out to be one of the most important aspects in 
the pragmatisation of phenomenology. Husserl himself also addressed the issue. How, 
according to Husserl, can the meanings we attribute to phenomena be shared with 
other humans? It turns out to be quite difficult to describe intersubjectivity from a 
traditional phenomenological point of view, because in the combination of both 
phenomenological and transcendental reduction, the individual seems to become more 
and more isolated. There is no objective world to refer to, and since scientific 
structures are based on observations from the lifeworld, we have no a priori 
knowledge to share. 
Husserl solved the issue with a problematic transcendental intersubjectivity, 
asserting that the subject 'appresents' the other as a different subject in a pre-given 
transcendental structure. In the end, it turns out to be necessary to assume an original 
intersubjectivity preceding the world, which definitely raises the question why, then, 
it seems to be impossible to share meanings when cultures are incommensurable. If 
intersubjectivity precedes worldly conditions, then why should different cultures 
develop this large range of seemingly incompatible cultural systems?18 Maybe 
intersubjectivity does originate from the world after all. But basing intersubjectivity 
instead on a universal ontology conflicts with the intention of the phenomenological 
method to put the world 'in brackets'. According to Kockelkoren (1980), the 
pragmatisation of phenomenology can offer a solution to this problem with the idea 
that intersubjectivity is actively constituted in interaction. Social reality, i.e. the reality 
that can be described by social science, consisting of people living together and 
sharing meaning, becomes a dynamic process instead of a pre-given structure19. 
 
'Social reality cannot in any respect be conceived as the world. Social reality and its correlate 
social personality are continuously realised in daily life by routine.' (Kockelkoren, 1980, p.115, 
my translation) 
 
This addition to and modification of traditional phenomenology is necessary when we 
want to apply phenomenology to issues that involve elements of such a social reality. 
Environmental planning is definitely such an issue, since the design of a landscape 
influences the environment of the social practices by altering environmental 
conditions. Thereby, the landscape is connected to the realisation of intersubjectivity. 
However, as we will see, modern developments in phenomenology sought a different 
kind of solution, where intersubjectivity is identified with the cultural models that 
objectify the world. 
 
18 Kockelkoren (1980), pp. 90 and further. 
19 This corresponds to the view of ethnomethodology, which developed from both the philosophy of 
Schütz and the theories of language by John Austin. See Kockelkoren (1980), pp. 110 and further. 
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Postphenomenology 
Ihde: micro- and macroperception 
 
Don Ihde (1990) took one step further in the pragmatisation of phenomenology. He 
asked the question whether it is possible to integrate various aspects of 
phenomenological thought in order to understand the influence of technological 
development on our lives. Ihde, as opposed to Husserl, strongly focuses on 'the 
dynamics of perceptual-bodily activity in actional praxis' (p. 27). Whether this 
interpretation of phenomenology is justified is a question to be dealt with in more 
theoretical research. In any case, Ihde also recognises the emphasis of Husserl on 
scientific structures and how they emerge from the lifeworld. He sees the lifeworld as 
the concept capable of integrating the perceptual-bodily aspects and the structural 
aspects of phenomenological analysis, by showing the origin of scientific thought in 
practical activity. However, he finds that there now seem to be two kinds or levels of 
praxes: the material and practical on one side, and the ideal and theoretical on the 
other. 
Ihde disagrees with the derivation of the theoretical from the practical. He rather 
distinguishes two senses of perception: microperception and macroperception. 
Microperception is the immediate and bodily sensory perception. Macroperception is 
the cultural and hermeneutic (interpretative) kind of perception, based on cultural 
interpretative frameworks. According to Ihde, there is no macroperception without 
microperception, but neither is there microperception without macroperception. Thus, 
all perception is both bodily focused and guided by macroperceptual interpretative 
contexts. Two such contexts may be distinguished: the cultural context of daily life 
and the scientific frameworks of interpretation (Verbeek, 2000, p. 153). 
 
Verbeek: hermeneutic and existential directions 
 
Peter-Paul Verbeek (2000) recognises that phenomenology has been extended from 
Husserl's philosophy of consciousness regarding the origins of knowledge to the 
analysis of relations between humans and their world in a broad sense. But he also 
discovers a second extension in the connection of phenomenology with the 
philosophy of existence as founded by Kierkegaard and Sartre. Not only experience is 
now relevant to phenomenology, but also the way in which people form their 
existence. Verbeek uses the words praxis and acting for this aspect of the extended 
phenomenology. 
Verbeek now distinguishes two perspectives in phenomenology: the hermeneutic 
perspective, which starts from the side of the world in the intentional relation and 
analyses experience and meaning, and the existential perspective, which starts from 
the human side and analyses acting and existence. In philosophy of technology, the 
first perspective is found in Heidegger and the second in Jaspers. 
 
According to Verbeek, classical phenomenology bridges the gap between subject and 
object by showing that they are actually always related by the intentional directedness 
of humans towards their world. In his own approach, which he calls 
postphenomenology, subject and object are not only related, but they also constitute 
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each other mutually. In their relation, they shape each other and thus arises a specific 
objectivity of the world and a specific subjectivity of humans. This approach avoids 
both postmodern relativism and Husserl's turn towards idealism. Reality is not 
reduced to a system consisting of behaviouralistic or operationalistic patterns, and 
neither does reality become only a product of consciousness. 
 
Verbeek describes the role of artefacts in the relation between humans and their world 
in terms of mediation, a term taken from Ihde. By actively participating in the forming 
of the intentional relation – and thereby in the constitution of subjectivity and 
objectivity – artefacts influence both the way in which people experience the world 
and the way in which people realise their existence. Mediation of experience is 
described in terms of amplification and reduction of aspects of experience; mediation 
of existence in terms of invitation and inhibition of aspects of acting. For example, a 
television may change the way in which we experience the world, and a microwave 
may change the way in which we have dinner with the family. 
The concept of mediation will be indispensable for the approach developed in this 
thesis. The reader should keep in mind, therefore, that our relation to our environment 
can be changed by the influence of artefacts, and that we call this effect mediation. 
 
The relevance of phenomenology for environmental planning 
 
In phenomenology, especially postphenomenology, the focus of analysis is on 
relations between humans and their environment instead of on humans and the world 
as separate realms. When applied to environmental planning, relations between 
humans and the landscape can be analysed from a phenomenological perspective, 
such that the interaction between people and the landscape they live in can be 
described. This offers an alternative to the analysis of the landscape as a system of 
functions, produced by objectification of the landscape. 
 
Postphenomenology creates a perspective "from the inside". Instead of the outside 
perspective of an analyst, phenomenology describes developments starting from the 
directedness of humans towards their environment. Humans are related to their 
environment by interpretation and action, and changes in the environment may 
mediate this relation. Subject and object are constituted from their relation, and cannot 
be thought of in separation. In environmental planning, the "subjective" experience of 
the landscape and the "objective" structure of the landscape are constituted from the 
relation between people and the landscape. Thus, the two aspects of the problem of 
fragmentation – the objective fragmentation of the landscape and the subjective 
fragmentation within human experience – are two sides of the same relation, and they 
are constituted from this relation. In a phenomenological analysis in terms of human-
world relations, the two aspects are not separated, and the analysis provides a starting 
point for integrated solutions. 
 
In postphenomenology, microperception is focused within the individual human-
world relation. Macroperceptual frameworks serve as an existing interpretative 
background – a culturally defined one – in which perception takes place. Although 
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postphenomenology can provide an analysis of the relations between people and their 
environment, in terms of intentionality and mediation, it focuses on individual 
perception and acting, and it does not include concepts for the description of social 
practices. We will define social practices as patterns of conduct that include the 
sharing of meaning between individuals by (imitative) learning in common activities. 
One may think of the student population at a university as an example. Within the 
social environment, practices are formed which enable the identification as a student 
by being involved in common activities based on shared meaning, such as attending 
lectures, playing sports or going out. These practices cannot be explained by the 
individual relation to the environment only. 
 
The relation between people and the landscape cannot be adequately described 
without concepts referring to social practices, since the social conduct of humans is 
strongly connected to and influenced by the environment they find themselves in. The 
example of the design of the recreational structure for a national park exemplifies the 
issue: the use of marked routes, parking lots and restaurants refers to a body of social 
practices of using the landscape, based on shared meaning, and cannot be understood 
without it. Every intervention in the landscape may influence such social practices. 
For example, the appearance of marked hiking trails in a national park not only guides 
the practices of hiking there directly, but also influences the practice in how it is 
applied in different areas. If the practice is in this way directed towards the implicit 
shared meaning that "hiking requires marked trails", a profound change in behaviour 
may be invoked. The processes of interpretation involved here can neither be 
explained by individual microperception nor by cultural macroperceptual frameworks 
of interpretation, since this neglects the intersubjective character of the practices 
involved. And yet such changes do occur. A phenomenology of environmental 
planning should therefore include concepts to analyse these issues. 
 
With respect to the possibility of shared meaning, Kockelkoren (1980) holds that from 
a phenomenological point of view, intersubjectivity should be considered as actively 
constituted in interaction. Following this insight, macroperception is not just a cultural 
context in which the individual microperception occurs, but the shared meaning that is 
involved is actively constituted within the relation between people and their 
environment. This explanation can account for the change in practice in the hiking 
example, where the active constitution of shared meaning leads to changes in the 
social practices. 
 
To enable the application of postphenomenology to issues of environmental planning, 
we therefore need to extend postphenomenology with concepts that enable the 
analysis of the social aspects of the intentional relation, rather than only the individual 
microperceptual relation and its contextual macroperceptual background. This is the 
main problem that will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Praxis 
 
A concept that may explain social practices from a phenomenological point of view is 
the concept of praxis. However, the use of the term in phenomenology may be subject 
to considerable confusion. It can simply mean a way of handling situations including 
both hermeneutic and existential aspects (both interpretation and acting), 
independently of any distinction between science and lifeworld whatsoever (Ihde's 
use). It can also mean a pre-scientific way of relating to the world (the praxis for 
which Husserl invented the term lifeworld). And lastly it can mean a characteristic of 
the existential perspective as opposed to the hermeneutic one – acting as opposed to 
interpretation (Verbeek). We will use it in the second meaning, i.e. a pre-scientific 
way of relating to the world, including both interpretation and acting. This is not to 
say that the same way of relating to the world does not occur in science, but that it is a 
characteristic of science that it is not only based on such a way of relating. The reason 
for this use of the term will become clear when we investigate the different ways of 
relating to the world. 
The term praxis is strongly connected to the discussion of intersubjectivity above. 
The pre-scientific way of relating to the world needs to include shared meaning to 
enable the co-operation of individuals and thereby the construction of societies. This 
shared meaning is interwoven with practices that operate on the environment that 
humans find themselves in. This points out the importance of the role of 
intersubjectivity in phenomenology of environmental planning. We concluded that we 
needed to describe the constitution of social reality as an active, dynamic process. Our 
use of the term praxis refers to exactly this process of constitution of a social reality. 
Berger & Luckmann (1966) provide a comprehensive analysis of such constitutive 
processes. A preliminary definition may be: 
 
praxis is the continuous realisation of a social reality based on intersubjective 
assignment of meaning by processes of interpretation and acting 
 
According to this definition, the praxis is based on the whole of social practices in a 
social environment. By processes of learning in a common environment, shared 
meaning is formed and a social reality is constituted. We already introduced the 
hiking example before. An example of how this works for birds is described by 
Bloom (2000). Bloom has a different opinion than Berger & Luckmann on the issue 
of the uniqueness of social behaviour to human beings. Whereas Berger & Luckmann 
conceive social behaviour as stemming from man's world-openness, Bloom argues 
that distributed intelligence in the form of complex adaptive systems, exhibiting 
interactive behaviour to co-ordinate efforts, is one of the primary forms of 
organisation of life. In creatures with memory, this leads to social behaviour and 
shared meaning: 
 
'[…] birds rely for their perception of the world on those around them. Experimenters put a 
young, inexperienced blackbird and an older, wiser flier in cages side by side. The savvy 
elder was shown an owl, and attacked the potential killer furiously. The youngster witnessed 
the emergency response, but couldn't see the predator it was directed at. Sly researchers had 
placed a partition in his line of sight. On the younger's side of the opaque divider appeared a 
stuffed honeyeater, a congenial creature which does not feast on blackbird meat. The setup 
was designed to convey the expression that the elder's pugnacity had been roused by the 
harmless sweet-snacker. Later the young bird was put next to an unseasoned fledgling like 
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itself. Both were shown the honeyeater. The newcomer was indifferent. But the bird who'd 
seen his elder go into a rage flew at the beehive connoisseur, assaulting it with might and 
main. Soon the novice picked up the message and joined in. Then it, too, was paired with a 
naïve bird who didn't have a clue. Like his teacher before him, the bird who'd learned his 
lesson demonstrated the importance of mobbing honeyeaters and passed the practice on. 
Wrongheaded as it was, the tradition was handed down through six blackbird generations 
before the experimenters called its quits.' (p. 40) 
 
The example makes clear how processes of interpretation and acting are interrelated 
in the construction of shared meaning and the constitution of a social reality. Social 
practices make this possible. This is what the term praxis implies in this thesis. When 
one replaces the blackbirds with humans and the honeyeater with a presence in a 
landscape, one may get a clue of the importance for environmental planning. The 
relevance of the concept of praxis becomes clearer when we describe the nature of the 
processes of interpretation and acting that are involved. We will come back to this 
issue after we discussed the pragmatic approach in philosophy. It is important to 
remember that praxis does not only refer to acting, but to experience as well. 
 
Conclusions 
 
An analysis of the landscape avoiding a spectator conception of experience, enabling 
alternatives to the division of space according to function, may benefit from a 
postphenomenological approach. Since phenomenology focuses on relations, and 
since postphenomenology understands subject and object as mutually constituted in 
their relation, the spectator conception is avoided. However, the distinction between 
microperception as individual sensory-bodily relation with the world and 
macroperception as existing interpretative framework does not allow the analysis of 
social practices in postphenomenology. Although Kockelkoren holds that 
intersubjectivity should be considered as actively constituted in interaction, 
postphenomenology does not enable such an analysis yet. Because practices of social 
character and adaptations in the landscape are interwoven, the analysis of 
intersubjectivity is important when applying postphenomenology to issues of 
environmental planning. Therefore, we need to investigate how intersubjectivity can 
develop from the directedness of human beings towards their environment, instead of 
taking it for granted as a context of perception. In this way, we can describe the 
influence of the landscape on intersubjective processes in terms of mediation. 
 
We will provide the basis for a more pragmatic approach that starts from the point of 
view that mind emerges from the world and from social conditions, and analyses the 
mutual constitution of subjects and objects in phenomenology from this point of 
departure. We have seen before that such an approach avoids subjectification and 
objectification, and thereby the spectator conception of experience. Moreover, it 
solves the problem of postphenomenology that social aspects cannot be analysed. The 
details of this approach will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4   
 
Pragmatism 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we investigate the philosophical concepts that can enable the 
discussion of social aspects within phenomenology. First, we will have a closer look 
at how intersubjectivity is formed. We will introduce two theories: one from the 
1960's investigating the foundations of a sociology of knowledge, and one recent 
study into societies as complex adaptive systems. These theories serve as examples of 
how a more pragmatic description of intersubjectivity is possible. Thereafter, the 
pragmatic approach in philosophy is introduced, enabling a philosophical discussion 
of intersubjectivity without taking a transcendental viewpoint. We will assess the 
benefits of its concepts for the inclusion of intersubjectivity within 
postphenomenology. 
 
Theories on intersubjectivity 
 
To be able to discuss intersubjectivity within postphenomenology, we need some 
background information on how intersubjectivity is understood in recent research on 
social interaction. The transcendental view on the issue has been replaced by a more 
pragmatic approach. Theories from various origins shed some light on how our 
relation to other people can be analysed, reflecting the shift in thinking from 
transcendentalism to pragmatism. They provide examples of how a more pragmatic 
description of intersubjectivity is possible. The example theories we present here 
serve as a starting point for extracting the essential concepts of such a description. 
The first theory we will present is one having its point of departure in 
philosophical anthropology, understanding the human being as a world-open animal. 
It was advanced by Berger & Luckmann (1966). The second one analyses societies as 
complex adaptive systems, another concept that rejects the transcendental view and 
focuses on worldly conditions. The latter theory has been vividly described by Bloom 
(1995 & 2000). Both theories show how we can describe intersubjectivity in a 
pragmatic way. After giving an overview of these theories, we will extract the 
elements of their respective conceptual frameworks that enable us to extend our 
phenomenological approach. 
 
Berger & Luckmann: the social construction of reality 
 
Berger & Luckmann (1966) try to establish the foundations of a sociology of 
knowledge from the point of view that reality is constructed socially. Their point of 
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departure lies in the philosophical anthropology of Plessner and Gehlen, who 
characterise the human being as a world-open animal. 
 
'Man occupies a peculiar position in the animal kingdom. Unlike the other higher mammals, 
he has no species-specific environment, no environment firmly structured by his own 
instinctual organization. There is no man-world in the sense that one may speak of a dog-
world or a horse-world. Despite an area of individual learning and accumulation, the 
individual dog or the individual horse has a largely fixed relationship to its environment, 
which it shares with all other members of its respective species. […] In this sense, all non-
human animals, as species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose structures are 
predetermined by the biological equipment of the several animal species. By contrast, man's 
relationship to his environment is characterized by world-openness.' (p. 45, my italics) 
 
Humans deal with the imperfect structuring of their environment by 
institutionalisation. In a social enterprise, the environment is given the necessary 
structuring by organising activity based on habitualisation. 'Institutionalization occurs 
whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors.' 
By means of institutionalisation, man produces his own reality, his own constructed 
objectivity. This happens in a relationship of three dialectical moments: 
externalisation, objectification and internalisation. The produced reality acts back in 
shaping man himself, including the understanding of his own identity and that of 
others. 
 
Intersubjective sedimentation of experiences in a common stock of knowledge is 
enabled by a linguistic sign system, which makes the experiences objectively 
available. Moreover, the sign system enables the construction of symbol systems by 
using elements of the system as symbols referring to another world (science, religion, 
art). This may lead to a symbolic universe legitimating the institutions. This is 
especially useful in transmitting the institutional order to a new generation, the 
members of which have not been engaged in its construction. However, the symbolic 
universe itself needs to be maintained by conceptual machineries. Berger & 
Luckmann mention mythology, theology, philosophy and science as types of such 
machineries. Universe maintenance may be implemented by therapy, using a 
conceptual machinery to keep everyone within the universe, and nihilation, 
liquidating conceptually everything outside the universe. 
 
Individuals internalise the objectified universe by processes of socialisation. Berger & 
Luckmann define socialisation as 'the comprehensive and consistent induction of an 
individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it'20 and distinguish 
between primary and secondary socialisation. Primary socialisation occurs in 
childhood in the relation with significant others, with which the child identifies. Later 
in life, institutional "subworlds" are internalised by secondary socialisation, and role-
specific knowledge is acquired. In this case, emotionally charged identification plays 
a far less important part. The individual now realises that the agents of socialisation 
are institutional representatives, and not mediators of the world, as which one 
understands one's parents in childhood. 
Socialisation is successful when a high degree of symmetry has been established 
between objective and subjective reality. In this case, there is 'a continual internal 
 
20 p. 120 
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dialectic between identity and its biological substratum'21, which has its external 
equivalent in a dialectic between the individual animal and the social world. Its 
manifests itself as 'the resistance of the biological substratum to its social molding'. 
Thus, man is an animal with a social-biological dialectic built in. 
 
Our main point of critique on the theory of Berger & Luckmann is that they too 
greedily reduce all animal learning to mere individual processes (see the italics in the 
quotation on the previous page). The social aspects of humans are then explained in 
terms of their built-in social-biological dialectic. Other research, however, indicates 
the importance of groups in the individual's relation to the environment, even before 
the emergence of the human race. We will present such a theory here. 
 
Bloom: social behaviour as the result of complex adaptive systems 
 
Howard Bloom (2000) views the appearance of mind and intelligence as the result of 
the networking of information in groups. 
 
'K.R.L. Hall has said that baboon groups provide "the essential setting for each and every act 
of learning by the individual … the group is the basic unit for … learning processes." […] 
Mammals not only network information across distance, they also spread the tendrils of what 
they've learned into the future, thus penetrating space and time.' (p. 54) 
 
Bloom sees life as essentially social, as the operation of a mass mind consisting of 
individual contributors. Such 'collective learning machines' combine five elements: 
• conformity enforcers, which make the group members act in similar manners, 
beneficial to the collective; 
• diversity generators, which continually generate new approaches to coping with 
the environment; 
• inner judges, which measure the individual's achievements and generate inner 
rewards or punishments in terms of the individual's well-being; 
• resource shifters, which transfer the resources to successful members of the 
collective; 
• intergroup tournaments, which determine the relative success of groups by 
confrontation, and force them to innovate to outrun the opponents. 
 
Whereas bacteria communicate information directly from individual to individual by 
exchanging chemical signals and DNA fragments, higher animals lost this ability due 
to the complexity of their organisation. Instead, they developed memory to store and 
exchange data.  
 
'When memory appeared, the effect was dramatic. A multicelled creature could quickly store 
experience in a nervous system's circuitry. This opened a way for a swift reprogrammer 
zoologist Richard Dawkins calls the meme - a habit, a technique, a twist of feeling, a sense of 
things, which easily flips from brain to brain.' (p. 30) 
 
'Memes - habits, new ways of doing things, and other commanding intangibles which migrate 
from mind to mind - are key to the next jump up in networking. Memes come in two stripes: 
 
21 p. 167 
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implicit, those which belong to the animal brain; and explicit, those which depend on human 
neural addons, the cranial gizmos responsible for syntactic speech.' (p. 49) 
 
One of the pioneers in developing something like science from the latter type of 
memes was Thales. He exchanged ideas between societies and made his own 
discoveries. 
 
'Thales also helped initiate the concept of secular philosophy, reducing the perverse magic of 
a persnickety universe to elements graspable by reason. Among other things, he tossed aside 
the habit of explaining everything via mythology and generated a down-to-earth theory of 
how this cosmos had come to be. The world, he declared, had self-assembled from water and 
from "psyche". The macrogods of sky were banished in favor of microgods one could finger 
in a stone or chew in a leaf of grass… for, as Aristotle put it in one of his references to 
Thales' cosmogony, "all things are full of gods" - an early way of saying that each object has 
its own inherent properties.' (p. 128) 
 
Science thereafter developed into a comprehensive methodology of understanding and 
adapting the world. However, even in science our behaviour is still largely based on 
what others see and do and on what has become accepted. Habits or memes are not 
eliminated by scientific method. Rather, science is one special combination of habits. 
 
'Even the most highly trained observers end up mixing fiction with their "facts". Before 
chromosomes were discovered, scientists used their microscopes to examine cells in minute 
detail, then drew what they had "seen". Not a single chromosome showed up in their 
renderings. After chromosomes had become accepted truths, researchers suddenly peppered 
their cellular portraits with the things. Lacking the concept of the chromosome, observers 
would have sworn the chromosomes were not there.' (p. 65-66) 
 
According to Bloom, reality is thus constructed by social agreement on what is there. 
Moreover, our self-image is constructed in the same process as our reality. 'The left 
brain's consciousness uses the material it's handed […] to construct two theories of 
"reality": one of the self and the other of an outside world.' (p. 69) Subjectivity and 
objectivity are mutually constituted, as in postphenomenology. But the process is not 
just an individual one; it includes aspects of a collective learning machine, in which 
reality is socially constructed. 
 
The pragmatic turn in phenomenology 
 
We presented two example theories that investigate intersubjectivity from a pragmatic 
instead of a transcendental point of view. The question is which concepts in these 
theories are relevant for an extension of the postphenomenological approach that 
enables discussion of intersubjectivity. 
 
The problem of phenomenology is that it has too much been focused on relations of 
the individual human being with his environment, whereas the theories presented 
above show that 'mind can arise only within in a social condition'22: aspects of the 
social environment determine for a main part the experiences and actions of the 
individual. Both Berger & Luckmann and Bloom mention the importance of habits in 
the social condition. According to Berger & Luckmann, habitualisation and 
 
22 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Dewey. 
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institutionalisation provide the necessary organisation of the imperfectly structured 
environment of man. For Bloom, habits are the communication means by which 
mammals network their intelligence. Both perspectives, a sociological and a 
biological one, respectively, point out the importance of sociality in understanding 
individuals. To provide a phenomenology that takes this aspect into account, the 
possible role of habits in phenomenological analysis needs to be investigated. 
 
It may be argued that western philosophy has been more occupied with observation 
and knowledge than with behaviour, and that this characteristic accounts for the still-
lacking possibility of integrated analysis of social aspects in phenomenology. In any 
case, philosophy has for a long time been focused on the individual position of a mind 
in this world (cogito ergo sum), but recent insights require a change in thought. Mind 
or consciousness emerges from social conditions, and should be so analysed. The new 
way of conceiving the philosophical task has already been elaborated in the first half 
of the 20th century by the pragmatist or instrumentalist philosopher John Dewey. 
 
In the following parts of the chapter, we will introduce the instrumentalist or 
pragmatist approach to philosophy, as presented in the theories of Dewey. The theory 
of Dewey provides a philosophical rather than a sociological or biological basis for 
describing the relation between individuals and their environment, from a social 
perspective. The concept of habits, of which we saw the importance in recent 
scientific developments, can thereby be translated into a concept within a 
philosophical framework. 
The pragmatic view on phenomenological issues should provide a more balanced 
theory of the individual and collective aspects within phenomenology, and thereby 
enable the analysis of intersubjectivity in postphenomenology. This is what we call 
the pragmatic turn in phenomenology. The theory of Dewey serves as a basis for this 
turn. 
 
First, we will present a theory on the way in which our culture developed. This theory 
will prove useful as a means for relating pragmatism to other approaches, especially 
phenomenology, and for understanding its impact on philosophy in general. We will 
later use the theory to explain the advantage of a combined approach over pragmatism 
without a phenomenological framework. 
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Three phases in western cultural development 
 
Van Peursen (1970) distinguishes three phases in the development of western culture. 
In all three phases, he discovers a positive and a negative tendency. The positive one 
enables the improvement of life by providing a means to cope with the environment. 
The negative one overemphasises the power that can be attained by the culture's 
strategy, fixes cultural patterns in order to maintain this power, and thereby decreases 
the possibility of alternatives and adaptation to new circumstances. 
 
In the mythical phase, man is a participant in the world around him. There is no sharp 
division. Self-identification is hardly possible; values are strongly connected to 
kinship and the powers of life. The negative tendency is here magic, which tries to 
gain power by performing rituals not so much connected to religion, but to secret 
doctrine of control. 
In the ontological phase, the distance between man and nature is increased. An 
ontological theory of being, which transcends transitory existence by referring to 
essence, provides a means for structuring the world, which can be known by 
correspondence between the objects and the products of reason within the subject. 
There is a striving for the perfect and the ideal. When this is overemphasised, and 
isolated substances are assumed for man, world, God, values, substantialism comes 
into being as the negative tendency. Meaningful connections are thereby broken. By 
means of isolating and limiting, power can be attained over the environment. 
In the functional phase, the relation between different presences moves to the 
foreground. Absolutes are abolished in all parts of human existence. Both reality and 
knowledge get a more practical character. Meaning becomes associated with patterns 
of habits, instead of being a representation of the ontologically structured world. The 
ontological separation of truth, virtue and beauty disappears. Structures are considered 
historical rather than metaphysical. The negative tendency, operationalism, manifests 
itself in identifying the model with the thing itself, identifying the system with its 
application. This reflects the idea that things are only what we can do with them, by 
using the power we gain over them by knowing how they behave. 
 
The functional view has been emphasised in philosophy by the movement of 
pragmatism or instrumentalism. According to Richard Rorty, John Dewey is one of 
the best representatives of pragmatism, which he understands from a radical anti-
representationalist viewpoint. He describes anti-representationalism as 'the 
abandonment of a "spectator" account of knowledge and the consequent abandonment 
of the appearance / reality distinction'. From this point of view, the best and purest 
representatives of pragmatism – those least infected with reductionistic thinking – are 
Dewey and Davidson.'23
 
Pragmatism or instrumentalism focuses on what we can do rather than on what things 
are. Thus, pragmatism emphasises the functional aspects of philosophy rather than the 
ontological aspects. It is important to keep this in mind when reading about 
pragmatism. The philosophical approach of Dewey, providing a philosophical basis 
for our pragmatic conception of phenomenology, will be explained next. 
 
23 Murphy (1990), p. 5. 
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The pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey 
The new task of philosophy 
 
In Reconstruction in Philosophy (originally published in 1920), John Dewey (1859-
1952) describes the new task that pragmatism assigns to philosophy. In order to 
explain the necessity of this task, Dewey gives a historic account of the emergence of 
philosophy. It is important to understand this analysis for the sake of being able to 
relate Dewey's pragmatism to other approaches. Dewey wanted to develop philosophy 
in a very specific direction, and the contents of his work cannot be understood without 
understanding this background. 
 
According to Dewey, the first philosophies were rooted in desire and imagination 
rather than in attempts at scientific explanation of the world. Traditions emerge from 
the recollection of events for the sake of satisfying the capabilities of memory when 
not used for urgent purposes. This material first becomes textured and develops into 
rites. New group members are introduced into the body of acquired group memory by 
education. Political consolidation reinforces this process, because unified beliefs 
promote social unity. Next to this organisation of doctrine, matter-of-fact knowledge 
develops from experience with the actual behaviour of the world with respect to the 
requirements raised by practical issues, e.g. food, dangers, and especially arts and 
crafts. 
 
When matter-of-fact knowledge increases, it may start to conflict with inherited 
doctrine stemming from desire and imagination. Dewey states that this conflict is 
exemplified by the sophists and Socrates in ancient Greece. The rigour with which 
their ideas and methods were discarded, accounts for a strong defence of the realm of 
tradition against the matter-of-fact approach. However, the increasing importance of 
the practical knowledge demanded a new way of looking at and justifying tradition. 
This may be the task that Plato implicitly assigned himself. Philosophy now had to be 
the means of re-investigation of the inherited body of beliefs, and developing a 
method that could claim to derive the most fundamental of these beliefs over again, 
but this time from necessity instead of inheritance. 
 
Dewey regards most of western philosophy as emerging from this task set in the 
beginning. He distinguishes three traits of this philosophy: 
1. It had the prejudiced task of extracting 'the essential moral kernel out of the 
threatened traditional beliefs of the past' (p. 18); 
2. 'Since it aimed at a rational justification of things that had been previously 
accepted because of their emotional congeniality and social prestige, it had to 
make much of the apparatus of reason and proof' (p. 20); 
3. Because the body of beliefs dictated by desire and imagination was 
comprehensive and universal in character, philosophical reflective thought 'should 
aim at a similar universality and comprehensiveness', and is therefore concerned 
with a 'superior reality' (p. 22). 
 
The appearance of the autonomous subject in the Renaissance has been actively 
approached by the apologetic kind of philosophy, in order to derive the culturally and 
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religiously motivated tradition from necessity for the last time. This time, the 
necessity did not come from teleology, neither from Christianity, but from the 
autonomous subject that finds itself thinking. However, the motive of this claim for 
necessity still lies in maintaining traditional beliefs. Reason now is no longer guiding 
nature or the world directly, but through the operation of the autonomous subject. 
Nature can now be reduced to meaningless processes of change, as long as we justify 
and preserve the tradition of necessary human values by deriving them from the 
autonomous individual reason. 
 
The distinction between human and non-human existences, or mind and matter, is the 
sole reminiscence left of the ancient categorisation of ideas. The realm of the superior 
has been shrunk into the individual, who finds himself in a world of matter from 
which the gods have withdrawn, and finds the last necessity in his own existence as a 
thinking spiritual being; a necessity that stems from the requirements of universality 
and proof in the search for re-foundation of tradition in apologetic philosophy. It is 
this development that accounts for the strict separation of subject and object in 
modern philosophy, and therefore is the father of the idealism-realism debate. 
 
Dewey argues against this 'spectator conception of knowledge'. If a modern scientist 
wants to know something, he starts to do something: 
 
'Modern science no longer tries to find some fixed form or essence behind each process of 
change. Rather, the experimental method tries to break down apparent fixities and to induce 
changes. […] Consequently, the scientific man experiments with this and that agency applied 
to this and that condition until something begins to happen; until there is, as we say, 
something doing. He assumes that there is change going on all the time, that there is 
movement within each thing in seeming repose; and that since the process is veiled from 
perception the way to know it is to bring the thing into novel circumstances until change 
becomes evident. In short, the thing which is to be accepted and paid heed to is not what is 
originally given but that which emerges after the thing has been set under a great variety of 
circumstances in order to see how it behaves.' (Dewey, 1957, p. 113-114). 
 
The simultaneous appearance of the autonomous subject and the autonomous space, 
as explained by Lemaire, is not as obvious as it may seem. The autonomous subject 
might as well have become an inquiring existence, entangled in an intimate relation of 
inquiry with the world, if only philosophy would not have been more occupied with 
ascertaining existing values than with constructing a philosophy of inquiry for the 
newly created human attitude. This approach in philosophy made it necessary to fix 
the old certainties within the new attitude, and therefore separate the subject and its 
values from the world it investigates. Fixed tradition should not be the matter of 
investigation, and therefore the human spectator should be set apart from the things he 
is observing. 
 
Seen in the light of this analysis, it is no wonder that a 'scientific' conception of 
philosophy, stemming from the idea that philosophical theories are but hypotheses, 
still meets with the same kind of defence that the sophists were confronted with. 
However, this is exactly what Dewey wants to initiate. The idea of knowledge by 
inquiry, as proposed by Francis Bacon, has more or less completely been incorporated 
in the practices of natural science, but still seems to be absent in philosophy. It is time 
for a new approach. 
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Habits and praxis 
 
By focusing on inquiry, Dewey provides the basis of his pragmatic approach to 
human problem solving and learning. The theory of inquiry forms an important part of 
Dewey's instrumentalist philosophy. The main theme is that 'logical distinctions and 
methods of inquiry develop out of the process of problem solving activities. The logic 
of inquiry is not a set of norms existing independently of and prior to our cognitive 
efforts.'24 The object of knowledge is thus the outcome of a process. 
This is also the case for moral principles in practical as opposed to theoretical 
inquiry. Moral principles are constructed from human problem solving activities in 
the interaction with other human beings. The construction of good is therefore a social 
process. There are no fundamental principles apart from the concrete norms and 
values that emerge from interaction. Our social behaviour is not based on necessary 
principles, and neither on purely individual considerations or optimisations (as in 
utilitarianism). Everything that enables us to behave socially stems from interaction. 
 
According to Dewey, the interpersonal characteristic of our behaviour provides the 
possibility to construct public meanings by shared activity with shared features of the 
environment. We learn how to solve problems from our parents, teachers and friends. 
Therefore, our problem-solving capabilities can only arise within a social condition. 
But how can we solve problems within our social situation itself? Dewey argues that 
the same methods of inquiry are applicable (and should be applied) in both theoretical 
and practical research. The actions that lead to effective transformations of the social 
environment have to be learned by inquiry. 
 
How then, is it possible to obtain the possibility of social behaviour from interaction? 
Since Dewey focuses on inquiry instead of on the relation between an observer and 
the world, he does not need to introduce something like a "mind" or a "subject". 
Dewey sees the self not as a separate entity, but as a dynamic complex of habits. Ideas 
refer to habits of action, which are based on active participation with objects and 
language use in shared activity. It is not surprising that Dewey was very much 
interested in education. 
 
Habits have, as far as I know, never been discussed in phenomenology. Although it 
may be said that the concept belongs to a completely different language game, it can 
be very valuable for understanding intersubjectivity in modern (pragmatic) 
phenomenology, without taking a transcendental viewpoint. We have seen before the 
problems that Husserl met in his transcendental explanation, and the pragmatic 
tendency that phenomenology went through. Moreover, it is an explanation of social 
behaviour that avoids retracing all human decisions to rationality. In that way, we 
would again suppose some universal kind of reason operating through the individual 
human brain, and return to the apologetic task of philosophy, defending our tradition 
against matter-of-fact knowledge. 
Instead, social behaviour is acquired by developing habits by learning from group 
members. This explains the praxis, i.e. the continuous realisation of a social reality. 
Intersubjectivity is acquired by sharing habits, and thereby sharing meaning. Habits of 
inquiry then may lead to the formation of explicit scientific models and moral 
 
24 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Dewey. 
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principles, which include principles of rational reasoning as opposed to habitual 
decisions. 
 
By a description of social behaviour in terms of habits, the praxis is distinguished 
both from individual sensory-bodily aspects of our relation with the world and from 
scientific/rational contemplation. Whereas the sensory-bodily aspects realise the 
individual relation between the human being and its environment, and the scientific-
rational aspects realise the objectification25 of the world through (scientific) models, 
the aspects of the praxis realise an intersubjective social reality. All these forms of 
realisation of reality originate from interaction, not from a pre-existing subject. 
 
Thus, as the sensory-bodily aspects can be defined as the continuous realisation of the 
individual bodily reality, and the scientific-rational aspects can be defined as the 
continuous realisation of the objective-rational reality, the praxis may accurately be 
defined as the continuous realisation of an intersubjective social reality, which is the 
preliminary definition presented before. 
 
Our proposition here is that the latter is done by the forming of habits, which requires 
both interpretation and action. The nature of this interpretation and action in forming 
habits will be discussed later. 
 
Functional philosophy 
 
We have seen how pragmatism introduced the concept of habits into systematic 
philosophical thinking, by denying the distinction between man and nature or subjects 
and objects that had been the characteristic of what Dewey called apologetic 
philosophy. The advancement of habits as a philosophical concept enables us to 
discuss issues of intersubjectivity and social aspects of our relation to our 
environment from a pragmatic instead of a transcendental viewpoint. 
 
For a better understanding of the relation of Dewey's pragmatic approach to 
traditional philosophical methods, we may refer to the model of cultural development 
advanced by Van Peursen (1970), which we discussed before. The concepts 
introduced by Van Peursen serve to make clearer what Dewey wanted to see as the 
new task of philosophy. Whereas traditional philosophy had a strong relationship to 
ontology, Dewey argued for an instrumentalist approach. In terms of the model of 
Van Peursen, philosophy had not yet been able to move from an ontological phase in 
culture to a functional one. Pragmatism wanted to make this transition by declaring 
philosophy pragmatic instead of apologetic (substantialistic or essentialistic).  
 
This enables us to provide an approach in environmental planning that challenges 
existing attitudes, without referring to some forgotten hidden dimension or other 
spurious ontological claims. By taking a pragmatic attitude, the spectator conception 
of experience is left behind with the apologetic philosophy pragmatism criticises. 
However, we have to take care that we do not end up with an approach supporting the 
negative operationalistic tendency. Pragmatism has often been interpreted as 
 
25 Objectification should not be seen as connected to alienation here, but as a form of understanding 
that is essentially scientific. 
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operationalistic, reducing everything to meaningless behaviour. Although careful 
reading of Dewey's work objects to such an interpretation, it is not easy to extract the 
kernel out of the hints that are given for a different understanding. 
 
By focusing on relations, phenomenology has taken a large step in the path towards 
avoiding an operationalistic worldview. When one carefully reads both 
phenomenological and pragmatist texts, it seems that phenomenology can offer 
exactly the concepts necessary for a functional, pragmatic philosophy that however 
does not produce a seemingly operationalistic attitude. Still, we have to make clear 
how such a philosophy is possible, since pragmatism denies the subject-object 
distinction that characterises the intentional relation in phenomenology. 
 
The concept of selectivity 
 
To enable the combination of phenomenological and pragmatic concepts, we need to 
either introduce the subject-object distinction into pragmatism, or re-formulate the 
concept of intentionality within phenomenology such that it does not depend on this 
distinction. Since a conceptual distinction between subjects and objects may easily be 
interpreted as re-introducing the spectator perspective into pragmatism, we rather 
choose the latter option. We thus need a way of explaining the directedness of human 
beings towards their environment without referring to subjects and objects. 
 
Dewey's concept of 'selectivity in action', which, according to Dewey, all existences 
possess, forms the basis of the pragmatic re-formulation of phenomenology. The 
concept needs some explanation. First of all, Dewey does not intend to use philosophy 
to find something fixed in a world of change. Because everything is change and 
process, he rather intends to formulate models of how processes and changes relate to 
each other, like in natural science. Existence should therefore not be regarded as 
something like a fixed entity, but as a process. 
According to Dewey, the division of the world in human and non-human beings, or 
subjects and objects, is artificial and inspired by religious considerations rather than 
empirical inquiry. However, empirical data suggest that evolution does take place and 
humans do make choices, even though there is no reason to suppose something super-
natural in either nature or humans. Dewey finds an explanation for these observations 
in the principle that every existence demonstrates behaviour based on 'bias' or 
'preferences', whether it be an atom or a human being. This is what he calls 
'selectivity'. Selectivity thus characterises the processes of existence. 
 
'Preferential action in the sense of selective behavior is a universal trait of all things, atoms 
and molecules as well as plants, animals and man. Existences, universally as far as we can 
tell, are cold and indifferent in the presence of some things and react energetically in either a 
positive or a negative way to other things. These "preferences" or differential responses of 
behavior, are due to their own constitution; they "express" the nature of the things in 
question. They mark a distinctive contribution to what takes place. In other words, while 
changes in one thing may be described on the basis of changes that take place in other things, 
the existence of things which make certain changes having a certain quality and direction 
occur cannot be so explained. Selective behavior is the evidence of at least a rudimentary 
individuality or uniqueness in things. Such preferential action is not exactly what makes 
choice in the case of human beings. But unless there is involved in choice at least something 
continuous with the action of other things in nature, we could impute genuine reality to it 
only by isolating man from nature and thus treating him as in some sense a supra-natural 
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being in the literal sense. Choice is more than just selectivity in behavior, but it is at least 
that.' (Dewey, 1960, p. 265) 
 
Thus, the concept of selectivity enables us to describe an existence's relation to its 
environment without referring to a subject-object distinction. Dewey recognises that 
human selectivity in action is something different from selective behaviour of atoms. 
So, there must be various ways in which an existence can exhibit selective behaviour. 
This motivates the need to consider which modes of selectivity we have to include in 
our model to adequately describe the processes of mediation. A selection of modes of 
selectivity is required, for which we will present heuristics in the next chapter. 
 
By characterising choice in terms of selectivity, Dewey rejects an explanation from 
the separation of man and nature. This is a valuable tool in our philosophy of 
environmental planning, since we wanted to have an alternative to the spectator 
perspective that places man outside his environment in the first place. As we have 
seen, the spectator conception may lead to neglecting the relations and the mutual 
influence of humans and their environment upon each other, e.g. by dealing with 
fragmentation only in terms of objective characteristics of the landscape. Whereas 
pragmatism avoids the separation of man and nature by the concept of selectivity, 
postphenomenology recognised that subject and object are mutually constituted. This 
means that also from the point of view of phenomenology, the separation starts to 
disappear. The main question is how we can use the concept of selectivity to integrate 
phenomenological and pragmatist analysis. 
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Conclusions 
 
Current postphenomenology does not provide the means to analyse social aspects of 
the intentional relation. We have seen that recent scientific theories – explaining 
intersubjectivity from a pragmatic instead of a transcendental point of view – refer to 
the concept of habits to describe social behaviour. In philosophy, this perspective has 
been advanced by the pragmatist or instrumentalist movement, of which John Dewey 
is one of the best known and purest representatives. We have presented pragmatism as 
a means to include aspects of intersubjectivity and social behaviour in 
postphenomenology. 
 
In pragmatism, there is no distinction between subject and object. What, then, is the 
use of trying to integrate phenomenology and pragmatism? Firstly, phenomenology 
may prevent pragmatism from being interpreted as operationalistic, by focusing on 
relations. By presenting a perspective "from the inside", phenomenology makes it 
impossible to derive behaviour from mere functionality within a system. Secondly, 
the postphenomenology of Verbeek offers useful concepts for analysing the role of 
selectivity in a pragmatist worldview, as we will see. Thirdly, pragmatism prevents 
phenomenology from making transcendental claims about the existence of and the 
relation between subject and object, and the role of the intentional relation. This 
means that whereas phenomenology needs subjects and objects as the basis of the 
intentional relation, we do not claim a division of the world in subjects and objects at 
all. We focused on the pragmatist concept of selectivity as a means to describe 
human-world relations without assuming a subject-object distinction. 
 
Dewey has been extensively occupied with practices, both in science and in moral 
life. He vividly describes the practices that result in scientific knowledge. Unlike 
Husserl, he does not focus on the objects of knowledge as such. And unlike Ihde, he 
does not focus on perceptual-bodily relations. We conclude that within our 
phenomenological analysis, Dewey offers the means for both a pragmatic attitude 
towards philosophy and for a description of the praxis – which we defined as the 
realisation of an intersubjective social reality by processes of interpretation and 
acting. This is made possible by the introduction of habits as a philosophical concept 
by pragmatism. We need to combine phenomenology and pragmatism in order to 
build a framework for such an approach. The combined approach will be based on the 
description of different modes of selectivity. 
 
 43
A pragmatic phenomenological approach in environmental planning 
 
 
Chapter 5   
 
The three paradigms 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the possibility of describing relations between 
humans and their world from the perspective of selectivity, as a means to extend the 
postphenomenological approach. We argued that we have to describe various modes 
of selectivity to account for the complexity of human behaviour. If we can find a 
conceptual scheme in which many aspects of human-world relations are covered, we 
can integrate phenomenological and pragmatic analysis based on the concept of 
selectivity. 
A heuristic tool for composing a conceptual scheme in which phenomenological 
and pragmatic elements are combined is found in artificial intelligence. In artificial 
intelligence, intelligent systems are built that relate to their environment in some way 
in order to be able to perform some intelligent task (pattern recognition, natural 
language translation, game playing). Different paradigms have emerged based on 
different views on how human intelligence operates, and on how rational behaviour in 
general is possible. By investigating the constituents of each of the paradigms 
involved in modelling the relation of an intelligent system to its environment, we can 
conceptually distinguish different ways in which humans can relate to their 
environment. This is relevant for our discussion about selectivity. This analysis will 
be evaluated in terms of its contribution to a combined approach including 
phenomenological and pragmatic elements. 
 
Artificial intelligence 
 
As stated before, artificial intelligence models the way in which a system can relate to 
its environment intelligently. According to Russell & Norvig (1995), there are four 
possible goals of AI research: 
1. systems that think like humans; 
2. systems that act like humans; 
3. systems that think rationally; 
4. systems that act rationally. 
 
From a pragmatic point of view, the emphasis is of course on how systems act. And 
since we want to shed some light on how humans relate to their environment, we 
focus on the second approach here. Thus, the question that we consider from the point 
of view of artificial intelligence is how we can build systems that act humanly. This 
serves as a heuristic tool for describing the relation of an intelligent existence (such as 
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a human being) to its environment. There are various approaches in artificial 
intelligence that each provide a different answer to this question. 
 
History 
 
The name artificial intelligence was given to a new field of research in 1956. The 
research aimed at making machines perform "intelligent" tasks like proving 
mathematical theorems or playing chess. Applications were both constructed for 
symbolic or logicist systems, using symbols to represent the knowledge content, and 
systems simulating the neurones in the human brain (subsymbolic or connectionist 
systems). After the publication of a critical book26 in 1969, research efforts in neural 
networks rapidly decreased. Symbolic approaches, using explicit models of 
environment, knowledge and reasoning, then became the main movement in AI. 
However, in 1986 new research27 showed promising possibilities for connectionist 
approaches as well. Since then, symbolic and subsymbolic approaches have existed 
side by side, with the different backgrounds and presuppositions more or less taken 
for granted. 
 
Now what are the differences between the two approaches from a philosophical point 
of view? Neural networks and related technology simulate the processing of signals in 
the human brain. Symbolic systems simulate the reasoning capabilities on symbols 
that humans possess. Symbols are in this case part of a model, in which the symbols 
are related to each other such that reasoning is possible. In connectionist approaches, 
there is no explicit model that is used in the reasoning. Of course, the implementation 
of neural networks is itself based on a model of the human brain, but the reasoning 
itself involves only signals, and no explicit model. 
 
Meanwhile, attempts were made to perform some sub-tasks in the symbolic approach 
based on statistical techniques, for example part of speech tagging in texts. And, more 
interesting, instead of only storing statistical information about past occurrences, it is 
also possible to store previous experiences explicitly, as cases. 'What is case-based 
reasoning? Basically: To solve a new problem by remembering a previous similar 
situation and by reusing information and knowledge of that situation.' (Aamodt & 
Plaza, 1994). 
 
Agents in virtual environments 
 
In computer science, recent developments show an increasing interest in modelling 
virtual environments. These may include a virtual landscape, or other types of virtual 
surroundings, and interaction with other (either human or non-human) characters. 
Things get more interesting when we are able to place virtual characters in such an 
environment. For example, the research group TKI (Language, Knowledge and 
Interaction group) at the University of Twente created a virtual music centre with an 
information desk, modelled after the real one in Enschede. Here, a virtual person can 
inform you about the concerts that are taking place. 
 
26 Perceptrons by Minsky and Papert 
27 Parallel Distributed Processing by Rumelhart and McClelland 
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The virtual characters as described here are called agents. Agents can handle different 
types of input and perform different kinds of actions depending on their capabilities. 
Agents may respond to speech, gestures, text input etc., and the surroundings may of 
course play a role. And agents may themselves perform actions based on how they are 
configured. So, the combination of different types of input may result in behaviour 
consisting of different kinds of output. These different possibilities of interacting with 
the environment (e.g. speech, gestures, text) are called modalities. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Example of an agent  
Source: Parlevink website, http://parlevink.cs.utwente.nl 
 
The interesting characteristic of this research is that it involves modelling human-like 
behaviour, and therefore has a strong link with aspects of human intelligence and 
behaviour. The different approaches in artificial intelligence can all be applied to the 
construction of the agents, and the results may show further insights in how different 
aspects of intelligence can co-operate in humans. We will analyse the relation 
between the positions of the different approaches after a more elaborate description of 
each of them. First, we will further introduce the possible approaches by describing 
their application within the research topic of agents in virtual environments. 
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Intelligence paradigms 
 
How can we design such virtual characters? There are two important things to 
investigate: how to determine relevant actions in a situation, and how to adapt to new 
situations, i.e. learning. For example, if you ask the music centre agent for a certain 
concert, the agent should reply with the date and time of this particular concert. And if 
you ask for the price, the agent should not repeat the date and time information. Now 
the most easy way to achieve such behaviour seems to be modelling the relation 
between input and output for any possible input. So, if the agent receives a question 
from you, it interprets the question by using a language model, reasons about the 
contents of the question using a reasoning model, and uses a language model again to 
produce the output. 
A language model may contain a dictionary, a grammar, and a list of expressions 
with deviating meaning ("it's raining cats and dogs", which would produce a nonsense 
interpretation using just dictionary and grammar). A hard problem in language 
interpretation is resolving references to previously occurring words. E.g., what is the 
correct interpretation of "The book is on the table. It is red."? Either the book or the 
table is red, but the context of this piece of language should reveal which one is 
meant. Thus, modelling language (and behaviour in general; gestures are not quite 
easier) still is a challenging task and requires ongoing research. We call this approach 
of behaviour generation model-based reasoning. 
It would be interesting to have the agent learn new behaviour during operation, but 
it is difficult to adapt a pre-defined model during operation. For example, how can an 
agent add a correct interpretation of "it's raining cats and dogs" to its model? First, 
how do we implement the model such that adaptation is possible? Second, how do we 
specify the correct interpretation, apart from the context in which the sentence is 
used? We can only know how we should react to such a sentence, but that does not 
specify a formal interpretation apart from how to use it. 
 
There is, however, an alternative to explicit modelling of the input-output relations. 
We can instead base the generated behaviour on previously encountered situations, 
called cases. We therefore store the situation, the performed action and the result of 
performing that action. When we encounter a new situation, we compare it to stored 
situations, compare the desired result with the result achieved in previous situations, 
and generate an action based on the best matching known situations. This method of 
behaviour generation is called case-based reasoning, i.e. reasoning by habit. 
A simple example (Pieters, 2002): the agent knows that a good reply to the 
question "where is the blue cube?" is: "the blue cube is on the red table". Now, the 
situation is specified by the question "where is the green cube?". Furthermore, the 
agent knows the fact "the green cube is on the yellow table". It can therefore, based on 
the known similar situation and the known fact, generate the reply "the green cube is 
on the yellow table". This reflects the idea that meaning is use, i.e. the meaning of a 
sentence is defined by how it can be used. 
However, it may be difficult to find a way to represent the cases. Since the agent 
does not use an explicit model, it has to learn to structure the cases based on the 
situations it encounters. The method of structuring, therefore, must be explicitly 
defined. When we cannot or do not want to do so, we may use a different method 
instead. 
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By using neural networks, we insert signals into a simulation of the functioning of 
neurones in our brain. The signals are processed throughout the network, and by a 
feedback mechanism, parameters of the network are adapted such that learning 
becomes possible. The method of structuring is now implicit in the way in which the 
parameters of the network are adjusted. The network itself therefore determines how 
the incoming information becomes structured. New signals applied to the input of the 
network are reflected in the signals at the output. The signals at the output can then be 
further interpreted. We will call this approach signal-based reasoning. 
 
We will describe each of the approaches in more detail to provide the reader some 
knowledge of the technological background. Readers not interested in the 
technological aspects may want to skip these details. 
 
Model-based reasoning 
 
When an explicit model is used for reasoning, every situation is explained in terms of 
the parameters of a model, and by applying rules within the model, the appropriate 
action is determined. This action is then implemented in the agent's environment. 
 
First, the input information needs to be formalised such that it can be recognised by 
the system as an instance within its model. For example, when playing a game of tic-
tac-toe, the system needs a formalised representation of the board, and of each move a 
player makes. For each move of the opponent, the system analyses the situation. The 
system can then, by reasoning about what happens if it makes a certain move, 
determine its best move and perform it. 
 
Learning is difficult within this paradigm. Imagine that we change the rules of tic-tac-
toe somehow, and that the system has to adapt to the new situation. In order for 
learning to occur, the model has to be adapted. This means that new features of the 
model have to be determined based on relations between occurrences in the 
environment. This means that induction is necessary to enable learning. The 
implementation of induction is far more difficult than the implementation of the 
deductive reasoning that leads from problem to solution, because there is no strict 
logic guiding the process. This is why in practice, model-based reasoning systems 
often lack the ability of learning. 
 
Case-based reasoning  
 
If we were to implement tic-tac-toe by case-based reasoning, adapting to the new 
rules would simply involve storing cases about the new situation and "forgetting" the 
old ones that do not yield the desired result anymore. 
 
Case-based reasoning (see also Pieters, 2001) is an approach to building intelligent 
systems which is based on research indicating the importance of the reminding of 
previous situations in problem solving and learning. Analogical reasoning is thus 
important to guide the problem solving. But the roots of this movement in AI go as far 
back as Wittgenstein, who 'observed that "natural concepts", i.e. concepts that are part 
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of the natural world – such as bird, orange, chair, car, etc. – are polymorphic. That is, 
their instances may be categorized in a variety of ways, and it is not possible to come 
up with a useful classical definition, in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient 
features, for such concepts. An answer to this problem is to represent a concept 
extensionally, defined by its set of instances – or cases.' (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994). 
 
When Dreyfus (1986) criticised artificial intelligence because of the formalisation of 
reality, he saw as one of the assumptions of symbolic AI that reasoning is viewed as 
rule-based symbol manipulation (the psychological assumption). The paradigm of 
case-based reasoning drops this assumption. Instead of rules, reasoning is based on a 
memory of stored cases. In CBR, reasoning is based on remembering. In solving a 
problem, the most relevant cases are retrieved and adapted to the new situation. CBR 
introduces two new assumptions (Leake, 1996): 
 
• the world is regular: similar problems have similar solutions; 
• the types of problems an agent encounters tend to recur. 
 
CBR needs both a regular world and knowledge that can be represented in a form that 
shows regularity. In this way, it is guaranteed that cases have relevance for future 
problem solving. 
 
To allow using the regularity assumption, we need to be able to determine the 
similarity of the representations. Similarity is a relation between knowledge 
representations expressing the regularity by indicating the degree in which the 
representations have the same characteristics. A similarity measure is therefore an 
important aspect of a CBR system. 
 
By assuming regularity instead of formalisability, case-based reasoning unties itself 
from the rationalistic tradition in philosophy. Instead, a connection may be observed 
between CBR and the empiricistic tradition. Thus, in artificial intelligence, an 
empiricistic view on design of intelligence has been adopted by the case-based 
reasoning paradigm. Weiss (1999) writes: 
 
'Case-based reasoning is based on the observation that humans often solve a 
problem on the basis of solutions that worked well for similar problems in 
the past.' (p. 283) 
 
Case-based reasoning can be used in application domains that are open and have a 
weak theory. An open domain is a domain which cannot be realistically modelled 
unless the problem solver's relationships with the external, changing world are 
anticipated by the model; a weak theory domain is a domain in which relationships 
between important concepts are uncertain, in contrast to e.g. mathematical domains 
(Aamodt, 1994). Because of the uncertainties in the domain, the truth of statements 
cannot be guaranteed. This means that truth-preserving inference and deduction are 
not the suitable means for reasoning. 
 
In CBR, both problem solving and learning are considered essential tasks. In fact, 
they are seen as complementary issues: ‘Complementary with the principle of 
reasoning by remembering is the principle that reasoning is remembered’ (Leake, 
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1996), ‘Learning in CBR occurs as a natural by-product of problem solving.’ (Aamodt 
& Plaza, 1994). According to Leake (1996), case-based problem-solving can be seen 
as ‘exploiting the relationship between two different types of similarity’. When there 
is a similarity between the input problem and some cases, a complementary similarity 
is assumed between the target solution and the case solutions. 
 
The main steps in the CBR problem-solving process are defined by Aamodt & Plaza 
(1994): 
1. RETRIEVE the most similar case or cases 
2. REUSE the information and knowledge in that case to solve the problem 
3. REVISE the proposed solution 
4. RETAIN the parts of this experience likely to be useful for future problem 
solving 
 
In the RETRIEVE phase, the current situation is interpreted in terms of previous 
cases. In the REUSE phase, a solution is chosen based on the retrieved case or cases 
and the solution is adapted to the current situation. In the REVISE phase, this solution 
is applied to the environment and feedback is collected concerning the successfulness 
of the solution. In the RETAIN phase, the case is remembered for future problem 
solving. 
 
Case-based reasoning does not explicitly generalise from the experiences stored. Only 
when a case is reused, its general characteristics are transferred to the new situation 
by adapting it. Generalisation is thus implicitly present in the adaptation process. This 
is called lazy generalisation. Because of this, no information about the cases is lost in 
the generalisation process; all information from the individual experiences is available 
for future use. 
 
For a more critical analysis of the CBR paradigm, see Pieters (2001). 
 
Signal-based reasoning 
 
In the beginning of the last century, the understanding of the human brain was 
speeding up because of pioneering work done by Ramón y Cajál. He introduced the 
idea that the brain is built up of neurones, or nerve cells. The neurones are connected 
by synapses, in which electrical signals are transferred from one neurone to the other. 
One neurone can thereby invoke excitation or inhibition upon other neurones, which 
determine the signal they send themselves upon the incoming signals. 
 
In signal-based reasoning, a signal processing system is built that somehow manages 
to show reasoning capabilities. In most cases, this is a signal processing system that 
mimics the human brain. Since the human brain is built of neurones, these structures 
are called neural networks. They can either be implemented by connecting small 
physical units, or by simulation on a computer. 
 
Like the neurones in the human brain, the neurones in neural networks establish a 
signal on their outputs based on the values of the signals on their inputs. The signals 
on the input are summed using the weights that are associated with each input. In case 
of excitation, the weight is positive, in case of inhibition it is negative. An activation 
 50
A pragmatic phenomenological approach in environmental planning 
 
 
                                                
function is applied to the summed input, and the result appears at the output of the 
neurone. 
 
 
 
 
 input 
function 
activation 
function 
input 1 
output 
input 2 
input 3 
w1 
w2 
w3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Schematic representation of a neurone 
If multiple layers of neurones are connected in a network, we can have the network 
perform some intelligent task like classification of input patterns. We connect the 
input signals to the input of the network. The output then represents the class to which 
the input is assigned. The network is also capable of learning, by providing the correct 
response and adapting the weights in the network based on the difference between the 
correct response and the actual response. 
 
The weights are the representation of the knowledge contained in the network28. By 
adjusting the weights, the outcome of the reasoning for specified input signals may 
become different. There is no explicit representation of the knowledge, and decisions 
made by the network can therefore not be explained by reference to something else 
than the signals themselves. Even though some neurones seem to take responsibility 
for a specific feature of the input after training, this relation between knowledge and 
weights can only be made explicit from the outside; not by the system itself. 
 
Justification of the paradigms 
 
The analysis of the three paradigms starts from the distinction between symbolic / 
logicist and subsymbolic / connectionist systems, as for example described by Russell 
& Norvig (1995). The distinction between symbolic and subsymbolic systems is well 
known in artificial intelligence. That the paradigm of case-based reasoning presents a 
third item in this series is less widely accepted. Usually, it is seen as a sub-field of 
symbolic AI. What are the arguments for adding this paradigm as a separate one?  
 
'Case-based reasoning is a problem solving paradigm that in many respects is fundamentally 
different from other major AI approaches. Instead of relying solely on general knowledge of 
a problem domain, or making associations along generalized relationships between problem 
descriptors and conclusions, CBR is able to utilize the specific knowledge of previously 
experienced, concrete problem situations (cases). A new problem is solved by finding a 
similar past case, and reusing it in the new problem situation. A second important difference 
is that CBR also is an approach to incremental, sustained learning, since a new experience is 
 
28 Assuming the structure of the network itself does not change, which is also possible. 
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retained each time a problem has been solved, making it immediately available for future 
problems.' (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994). 
 
Although case-based reasoning has been regarded as belonging to the symbolic 
approach, we will argue with Aamodt & Plaza that its basis is indeed fundamentally 
different, for the following reasons. Firstly, reasoning without a model is quite 
dissimilar to reasoning within a model. The methods that are applied have very little 
to do with each other, as can be seen in the description above. Secondly, although 
structuring a situation in case-based reasoning may be based on features of some 
model, the structuring of the cases can be implemented in a way that does not depend 
on a model in terms of features of the environment at all (Pieters, 2002). In summary, 
rational reasoning is replaced by habitual reasoning, and since this is a different aspect 
of intelligence with different assumptions (regularity as opposed to formalisability), 
case-based reasoning should be considered a third paradigm. 
 
We have argued that case-based reasoning should be added as a separate paradigm to 
the common distinction between logicist and connectionist systems. To prove that 
these three paradigms cover the whole field of artificial intelligence would not only be 
a task requiring much more thorough research into the foundations of artificial 
intelligence, but it would also be a very bold attempt. The research field is quite 
young, and new approaches may be expected to emerge within the near future. 
Moreover, from an instrumentalist point of view, the paradigms are instruments to do 
something, and we use them to do something in a quite different field, without 
pretending to have found the one truth. Thus, we use the analysis presented above as a 
heuristic tool, without claiming that it is exhaustive. 
 
Relevance for the pragmatic phenomenological approach 
 
The description of the different paradigms in artificial intelligence makes clear what it 
means for an intelligent system to relate to its environment. This relation can be 
modelled in three ways: by signal-based reasoning, case-based reasoning or model-
based reasoning. 
 
How does all this relate to a thesis about philosophy of environmental planning? We 
used examples based on language to make clear the different approaches of the 
paradigms. But not only language plays a role in how agents react to their 
environment. Other modalities influence the behaviour as well, and the surroundings 
may partly determine the way in which agents react. In this way, the (virtual) 
landscape can be included in behaviour generation. Landscape can be responsible for 
signals, for characteristics of situations, and for elements that occur within an explicit 
model. 
What explains the relevance of virtual environments and virtual characters for 
philosophy of environmental planning? Firstly, the way in which agents relate to their 
virtual environment and the way in which humans relate to their "real" environment 
must somehow be comparable. Artificial intelligence is not trying to generate 
behaviour of virtual characters completely apart from considerations of how humans 
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achieve relevant behaviour. The methods that are used in artificial intelligence 
therefore reflect ideas about how humans respond to their environment. They 
represent theories on how intelligence functions in human beings. I do not think that 
one of the paradigms will turn out to be the "right" one, since they cover completely 
distinct aspects of intelligence, which are not incompatible, but rather define co-
operating mechanisms that account for the complexity of human intelligence and 
behaviour. 
Secondly, the fact that in artificial intelligence we model the capabilities of such 
agents to relate to their environment enables a new way of discussing the mutual 
influence of humans and their environment. The topic of relations between humans 
and their environment has been extensively discussed in the philosophical movement 
of phenomenology. Both artificial intelligence and phenomenology, thus, have been 
researching relations between intelligent beings and their surroundings. The concept 
of selectivity, discussed in the previous chapter, forms the basis of the integration of 
these points of view, in order to provide a useful and comprehensive method of 
analysing human-world relations. The details of this integration will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
 
To be sure, I do not claim that artificial intelligence is capable of building systems 
that are directed to their environment in the same way as humans. However, the 
different approaches in artificial intelligence do indicate different aspects of the 
relation to one's environment, and I think this insight is quite useful in a pragmatic 
version of phenomenology. Insofar as the difference between various ways of relating 
to the environment cannot be made clear from existing philosophy, heuristics for 
these conceptual distinctions can be found in the artificial intelligence paradigms. 
This is not to say that the aspects of the three paradigms cover the whole of human 
intelligence. But all of these play a role in the complex way in which humans respond 
to their environment. I may react to a signal recognised by my body (touching 
something hot), a situation recognised by my habits (consoling my friend in a way 
that worked for others in the past), or an instance of a model recognised by scientific 
interpretation (applying a known theory in physics to solve a new kind of problem). 
Since all of these aspects are co-operating, the influence of changes in the 
environment on human experience and existence can only be adequately understood if 
we take these aspects into account. 
 
We can include these aspects in our approach by using the concept of selectivity. As 
we stated before, Dewey argues that human selectivity in action is something different 
from selective behaviour of atoms. We said that a selection of modes of selectivity is 
required. We already mentioned that the paradigms in artificial intelligence are based 
on theories on human intelligence, and therefore relevant to human-world relations. In 
the application to building intelligent systems, these theories have shown their 
relevance, especially for enabling agents to relate to their virtual environment. 
According to the theories behind the paradigms, humans relate to their real 
environment in the same kind of way. Therefore, we may accept the ways of relating 
to the environment as advanced in the three paradigms as three different modes of 
human selectivity. We distinguish between signal-based selectivity, case-based 
selectivity and model-based selectivity. Again, we emphasise that this set of modes 
may not be exhaustive, but at least we cover a large range of possible aspects of the 
relation between humans and their environment.  
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Thus, we found three different modes of human selectivity that may be relevant to our 
approach, corresponding to the paradigms of signal-based reasoning, case-based 
reasoning and model-based reasoning. The question is how it is possible to integrate 
this insight into our philosophical approach. The philosophical foundations of the 
different modes of selectivity will be investigated in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6   
 
Pragmatic phenomenology 
 
 
 
 
By introducing the philosophical movement of pragmatism, we aimed to find a way to 
include social aspects within postphenomenology. We advanced the concept of 
selectivity to be able to integrate phenomenological and pragmatic approaches 
without assuming a subject-object distinction. In the previous chapter, we discovered 
three modes of selectivity based on paradigms in artificial intelligence. In this chapter, 
the question is asked how we can combine phenomenological and pragmatist ideas 
based on the concept of selectivity, including the three modes we distinguished. The 
investigation should lead to a single framework for discussing environmental planning 
issues. 
 
First, we need to assess the possibilities of integrating phenomenological and 
pragmatist ideas within a common framework. The necessary concepts within the 
combined approach are then derived from a discussion of the phenomenology of 
architecture by Christian Norberg-Schulz. The chapter ends with the construction of a 
pragmatic phenomenological framework and vocabulary. 
 
Intentionality and selectivity 
 
When we want to combine phenomenology and pragmatism in a single framework, 
we need to integrate the main concepts of both approaches. From the point of view of 
phenomenology, we need to be able to describe intentionality and mediation. From 
the point of view of pragmatism, we need to avoid a subject-object distinction by the 
concept of selectivity. First, we will discuss the relation of these various concepts 
within what we call pragmatic phenomenology. Then, the issue of intersubjectivity 
and social aspects within the pragmatic phenomenological approach is investigated. 
 
The integration of intentionality and selectivity 
 
Because there is no subject-object distinction according to pragmatism, intentionality 
needs to be redefined when we use it from a pragmatist point of view. It can no longer 
be described as the directedness of a pre-existing subject towards an object, whether 
the object be a logically objectified phenomenon or the content of perception. 
However, when we use a pragmatist approach including the concept of selectivity, we 
can describe intentionality as the directedness of an existence exhibiting behaviour 
towards its environment, including both perception and action. The behaviour can be 
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explained in terms of selectivity. In the process characterised by selectivity, 
hermeneutic and existential aspects of the relation between the existence and its 
environment become visible. Hermeneutic aspects emerge in the selection of the 
contents of experience, and existential aspects emerge in the selection of the contents 
of action. 
By using the concept of intentionality, we enable an approach that avoids reducing 
all behaviour to functions or operations. Instead, an existence is always directed 
towards its environment by this intentionality, without which behaviour would not 
even be possible. Behaviour is thus not derivative of the functions an existence needs 
to perform, but directedness towards the environment is necessary for being able to 
exhibit behaviour and perform functions in the first place. Here, we also see how 
phenomenology can prevent pragmatism from being interpreted as operationalistic. 
Selectivity is not something that can be understood in terms of functions or behaviour 
within a system; we can instead understand it as necessarily connected to the 
directedness of an existence towards its environment. 
Selectivity integrates the hermeneutic and existential aspects of our relation to our 
environment in a single concept, where hermeneutic aspects are described as 
selectivity of the contents of experience, and existential aspects as selectivity of the 
contents of action. Intentionality must be assumed to be able to describe any kind of 
behaviour where the environment is relevant, but how the behaviour actually 
functions is described as selectivity. In this sense, intentionality is the transcendental 
explanation of the relation, and selectivity the pragmatic one. 
 
The selection of the different modes of selectivity makes possible a conceptual 
distinction between relating to the environment in terms of signals, situations and 
models respectively. Thus, we end up with different modes of selectivity instead of a 
subject-object relation as the basis of pragmatic phenomenology, guided by the three 
paradigms in artificial intelligence. 
The hermeneutic and existential aspects of the relation between people and their 
environment can be analysed for each of the different modes of selectivity. These 
aspects can be made clear by referring to the selection of the input (contents of 
experience) and the output (contents of action). In all intelligent behaviour, on the one 
hand selectivity determines what is seen, and on the other hand it determines what is 
done. In this analysis we can refer to the description of the paradigms to provide a 
guidance for the conceptual description. 
In this way, we can explain different aspects of intentionality by acknowledging 
that these aspects are related to different modes of selectivity. I can be directed to my 
environment in various ways, depending on the mode of selectivity that guides my 
behaviour. 
 
In pragmatic phenomenology, the intentional relation from phenomenology is 
generalised. In the intentional relation between existences, the existences themselves 
are constituted from their relation, as subjects and objects are constituted from the 
intentional relation in postphenomenology. The mutual constitution of existences is 
based on the selectivity they exhibit towards each other. This makes possible the 
translation of the concept of mediation to the pragmatic phenomenological approach. 
An existence29 may mediate in the relation between two other existences by 
influencing their selectivity, and thereby their mutual constitution. The concept of 
 
29 Here, the pragmatist concept of existence is meant, not only including humans 
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mediation functions in the same way as in postphenomenology, but there are two 
advantages. Firstly, the concept is generalised by basing it on selectivity rather than a 
subject-object relation. Mediation influences selectivity, and thereby changes the 
relation between us and our environment. We do not need to separate subjects from 
objects to conceptually understand this. Secondly, the pragmatic phenomenological 
concept of mediation enables the description of mediation within different modes of 
selectivity. 
 
The relation that constitutes existences based on their selectivity thus forms the basis 
of pragmatic phenomenology. In this 'intentional relation', if I am given permission to 
use the term in such a generalised way, the existences are related by hermeneutic and 
existential aspects – that is, selectivity of input (contents of experience) and 
selectivity of output (contents of action) – and the relation may be mediated by other 
existences. Mediation is not described as mediation of a subject-object relation, but as 
the mediation of different modes of selectivity found in conduct, both from 
hermeneutic and existential perspective. 
 
The Missing Link 
 
In classical phenomenology, intentionality was described as the directedness of 
consciousness towards logically objectified phenomena. In postphenomenology, a 
distinction is made between microperception and macroperception. The field of 
macroperception is described as an interpretative context, which cannot be analysed in 
terms of directedness. Microperception describes the perceptual-bodily relation of 
humans to their environment. Thus, both perceptual relations and interpretative 
frameworks are included, although the constitution of these frameworks from 
individual human-world relations is not explained.  
However, we can now, with the heuristic tool of the artificial intelligence 
paradigms, understand macroperception in a completely different way. It is not just a 
context, it is a different mode of selectivity. It is a mode of selectivity that is based on 
relating to the environment in terms of models: model-based reasoning. Next to the 
microperceptual sensory-bodily relation (signal-based), we thus find macroperception 
as a different aspect of our relation to the environment, not as merely a context. This 
means that we provide a different explanation of macroperception than Ihde. Our 
macroperception is active; it involves the construction and application of models. 
 
But what about the praxis, i.e. the continuous realisation of an intersubjective social 
reality? Individual perceptual relations can never account for intersubjective 
assignment of meaning. And, if we do not want to assume a priori intersubjective 
knowledge referring to a universal ontology, which does not exist according to 
pragmatism, we can neither base an intersubjective social reality on a universal 
understanding of the world. 
We have described directedness towards the environment both in terms of signals 
(perceptual-sensory content) and in terms of explicit cultural or scientific models. 
These two aspects can be related to the paradigms of signal-based and model-based 
reasoning, respectively. What we need for adequately describing the praxis, is 
directedness towards situations, or cases. The hermeneutic selectivity in the praxis 
consists of structuring the situation from the received perceptual signals by 
interpreting it in terms of previously encountered cases, and the existential selectivity 
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consists of determining the required action based on actions performed in similar 
previous situations, i.e. by habit. The intersubjective aspect stems from the 
observation that people tend to take over habits of others, i.e. re-using cases where 
other people are the performing actors. This may well be explained by the principle of 
learning by imitation. In this way, people share ideas by sharing habits, and thereby 
share meaning. 
 
In behaviour based on cases, people form a social reality by interacting. Thus, habits 
are formed which, according to Dewey, are the foundations of ideas: every idea is a 
habit of action. Habits thus constitute the social aspect of our relation to the 
environment, and explain intersubjectivity from a pragmatic phenomenological 
perspective. In order to better understand this aspect, from a phenomenological point 
of view, we will discuss a phenomenological theory that focuses on these issues. 
 
Phenomenology of the praxis 
 
The idea of a habitual structure underlying scientific abstraction is not quite new to 
phenomenology. Husserl claimed that theoretical frameworks arose from a concrete 
world of material and practical practices, the lifeworld. With a strong focus on this 
aspect, Christian Norberg-Schulz (2000) has applied phenomenology to the 
foundations of architecture. The book gives a good introduction into the concepts 
necessary for a phenomenological account of the case-based mode of selectivity. 
 
By focusing on the lifeworld as a phenomenological concept, Norberg-Schulz enables 
a discussion of how we relate to our environment in a pre-scientific way. This pre-
scientific way of relating can from our theory be described in terms of the paradigm 
of case-based reasoning, and its associated mode of selectivity. This means that 
Norberg-Schulz offers a phenomenological description of what we called the praxis. 
The parallel is useful in the development of a pragmatic phenomenological 
vocabulary. 
 
Both because he discusses buildings and the landscape, and because there is a strong 
parallel between the concepts Norberg-Schulz introduces and the mode of selectivity 
applied in the praxis, we give an extensive overview of his theory. We will derive 
some essential concepts in the pragmatic phenomenological approach from his work. 
The reader should keep in mind, however, that the strong focus on the lifeworld as 
something opposed to science results in a seemingly anti-scientific connotation of the 
arguments. This is something that the pragmatic phenomenological approach seeks to 
overcome. 
 
Presence, language and place 
 
Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000) was a Norwegian theoretician and philosopher 
of architecture. He tried to develop a phenomenological approach that could provide 
an existential foundation for architecture.  
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'Modern architecture was thought of as ART, and its goal was to heal the "fracture between 
thought and feeling" that sinks its roots as far back as Descartes, with his statement, "I think, 
therefore I am." This fracture implies limiting thought to the field of mathematics or the 
quantifiable, while reducing the scope of emotion to the areas of taste or subjective 
enjoyment. This rigid stance replaced earlier attitudes, in which explanation and meaning 
were unified in the totality of comprehension. It is the prerogative of art to register and 
express logically inexplicable relationships, links and bonds that cannot be quantified. 
Modernism, then, was an artistic movement, inasmuch as the expressive tool of art is the 
image.' (p. 7) 
 
According to Norberg-Schulz's book Architecture: presence, language, place (2000), 
the fundamental principles of modernism consisted in the unification of the practical 
and the expressive. Sigfried Giedion, with whose ideas Norberg-Schulz starts his 
book, initiated a new conception of time and space in architecture by emphasising the 
concepts of constancy and change. This leads to an increased interest in both 
monumentality (constancy in time) and regionality (constancy in space). These 
aspects root humanity in time and space, respectively. Constancy does not refer to 
unchangeable forms, but to an enduring relation between man and environment, 
which must be constantly reinterpreted. Constancy and change are not opposites. 
The ideas of modernism have never come to full flourishing. The pioneers had an 
inadequate understanding of everyday life and ended up supporting either thought or 
feeling. The focus on visual perception of forms oversimplified human existence. 
Norberg-Schulz sees phenomenology as a philosophical movement capable of 
overcoming these problems, by focusing on "being-in-the-world" or presence instead 
of autonomisation of subjects and objects. The ego becomes participant again instead 
of observer / spectator. Functions become derivative of use or behaviour. Constancy 
and change now become visible in the relationship between man and his environment. 
According to Norberg-Schulz, an image is neither a sign (indicative) or a symbol 
(representative), but it may contain both. The architectural image (the building) 
instead is a corporeal expression of presence, a structure that "opens" a world30. In 
modernism, the relation between aspects of tradition (signs) and aspects of style 
(symbols) is made explicit in their interaction. Thus, the architectural image may 
contain both aspects of tradition and of style, but it is determined by neither of them. 
In the philosophies that made possible this focus on the concrete and on the contact 
with reality, Norberg-Schulz remarkably mentions Husserl and Dewey in one 
sentence. 
 
Norberg-Schulz tries to clear up the foundations of modernism by a 
phenomenological approach, using ideas from both Husserl and Heidegger. He refers 
to the term lifeworld31 for clarifying the spatial and temporal stability that we 
experience. Under normal circumstances, we are not completely aware of every 
aspect of our environment, but rather habitually react to known situations. We will not 
mention all details of Norberg-Schulz's analysis here, but instead focus on what is 
relevant for a better understanding of the approach advanced in this thesis. 
 
Norberg-Schulz finds that Heidegger, by defining thinking being as Dasein, 'freed 
[phenomenology] from the intentionality of consciousness' (p. 70). The lifeworld was 
 
30 In postphenomenological terms: mediates the relation with the world. 
31 Actually, the English translation of Norberg-Schulz's book writes 'world of life', but for reasons of 
consistency, 'lifeworld' is used here. 
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reunified finally, and the Cartesian dualism resolved. The inherently dynamic aspect 
of Heidegger's approach, featured in the understanding of the lifeworld as a "taking 
place" or Ereignis, further contributes to a new and accurate understanding of 
comprehension. Norberg-Schulz considers the time ripe to apply such an analysis to 
landscape and architecture. 
 
'Over the last few years, numerous works have appeared treating subjects that concerned the 
world of life and the environment of everyday existence. It does not seem necessary that I 
analyse them, not because they are in any way lacking in philosophical interest, but because 
only in passing do they treat questions having to do with the concrete environment of things 
and places. Even in cases where the question of place arises, this happens in a very generic 
fashion, without any in-depth exploration of the landscape, which, as far as I am aware, has 
never been made the subject of adequate phenomenological analysis, This is truly deplorable, 
since the inhabited landscape is precisely the field of operation of architecture, and therefore 
there is an increasingly impelling need for a phenomenology of the landscape as a foundation 
for the practice of architecture.' (p. 74) 
 
'Phenomenology attempts to understand the interaction of ways of being on the interior of the 
totality and represents, therefore, the point of departure for most cultural positions, and 
especially as far as the art of place is concerned. The purpose of this art is to point out points 
of reference in the vagueness of this totality without abrogating it.' (p. 88) 
 
Norberg-Schulz refers to the present condition as a 'loss of place'. Scientific thinking 
has deprived us of our familiarity with our environment, both by changing our way of 
relating to the world and by changing the world itself, partly by ill-informed 
movements in architecture. To enable the use of place, which means being able to act 
without leaving the familiarity of the lifeworld, three things must be available: 
memory, identification and orientation. Our memory enables us to identify the 
surroundings and thereby to orient ourselves in the environment. But also the 
surroundings itself have a role in enabling such identification and orientation. When 
the continuity in time and space is disturbed, coherence lacks and identification and 
orientation are hindered. 
 
The combination of these aspects makes comprehension of the environment possible, 
and thereby the use of place. This use also involves an implementation, which adapts 
the place to its utilisation. Architecture, as the art of place, is part of such an 
implementation. 'Architecture is not a result of the actions of man, but rather it 
renders concrete the world that makes those actions possible.' Three aspects of the 
environment are important in architecture: space, form and figure. Space is the 
topological or geometrical spatial organisation of a place. Form refers to the 
appearance of structures rising into space, figure to the concrete things that build such 
forms. Space, form and figure together condition the genius loci, the 'spirit' of the 
place. 
 
According to Norberg-Schulz, the aspects of comprehension (memory, identification 
and orientation) must be a priori, and therefore rooted in precognition. They cannot 
emerge from empirical knowledge. He refers to Heidegger's concept of Gestalt, which 
he interprets as the understanding of a whole apart from its elements. 'Memory, 
orientation and identification of the aspects of use are fundamental to the 
comprehension of place. Recognition of the Gestalten qualities of the environmental 
unities is based on them and constitutes the presupposition for the rooting of a 
community.' (p. 87) 
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In summary, comprehension should be implemented in architecture in order to make 
possible the use of place. This is done by referring to an architectural language, with 
Gestalt, form and space as the components of this language, and by using these 
components rendering concrete figures. Architecture therefore includes typology, 
morphology and topology. A building consists of horizontal extension (rhythm) and 
vertical elevation (tension), which correspond to space and form, and is implemented 
as a concrete figure, but manifested as something durable, a Gestalt. 
 
The "Gestalten laws" define three governing principles, which should guide the 
configuration of the figure: proximity, closure and continuity. These are implemented 
by delimitation, extension and centralisation. The form, representing the elevation, 
includes both aspects of stability and aspects of change, and incarnates 'a place in 
which a space opens to "admit" the life that will take place there'. Horizontal 
organisation is composed of dominion, path and destination, which establish interior-
exterior relationships. There is no natural interior-exterior distinction, but it is only 
manifested in the use of place. The relevant aspects in horizontal organisation are 
those of separation and connection.  
 
"[…] the within-without relation constitutes a "field" of complex interactions and therefore 
entails movement. It is proper to the nature of a place that it belongs to a context to be 
concretised into a roadway structure. This structure is not only a presupposition of the use of 
place, but it reflects the "image" of the environmental identity. Taking the arrival as the point 
of departure, I have attempted in fact to free myself from the overarching consideration of 
place as a separate entity to be "planned", without taking into account the context to which it 
belongs. Unfortunately, nowadays planning of the sort, rather restrictive, is quite common, 
inasmuch as it does not take into account the relationship with the landscape. The 
phenomenology of arrival teaches us, on the other hand, that place must be understood as 
"entity", according to the basic expectation of precomprehension and in response to the given 
landscape." (p. 193-194). 
 
Norberg-Schulz declares similarity the superior and unifying type of organisation, 
explaining the principles of proximity, closure and continuity. This basic quality is 
lost when everything is "geometrised", as opposed to a topological organisation in 
which life takes place. Geometry and topology should therefore be unified. A 
synthesis between topology and geometry should be attained. 
 
'The most frequent unification is based on the "predominance" of the two structures. If the 
spatial organisation is purely topological, the respective buildings of the settlement will 
become banal. If it is only geometric, it will become abstract. These extremes are in practice 
unattainable, since every geometry must be implemented, and every topology implies a 
geometric tendency. As we have seen, the geometric structures are a specification of their 
topological counterparts. The expression predominance indicates the pre-eminence of one of 
these and consequently the weakening of the totality. And this happens so often that spatial 
organization has become an imposition from the exterior without any reference to moments 
of use.' (p. 214) 
 
Concluding, 'the art of place means unification of rhythm and tension so as to make 
possible the implementation of the comprehension of the world of life' (p. 217). In the 
history of architecture, both traditions of building and styles developed. The 
difference between those two developments lies in the ability of style to interpret the 
moments of use in constantly new ways: 
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'It is precisely this innate dynamic that distinguishes style from custom. While the 
manifestations of custom […] can be compared to a pretty and easy popular melody, style is 
instead a compositional element that offers manifold possibilities.' (p. 302) 
 
Norberg-Schulz finds the crisis of architecture due to the separation of customs and 
style by the reduction of comprehension to reasoning in the Enlightenment. 
Architecture then became pure style. This is precisely what original modernism tried 
to overcome. But how to achieve this? 
 
'[…] presence is inevitably the same even when it is not identical. Custom and style were its 
temporal manifestations, and now that in the present-day global situation they have lost their 
function, one may well wonder what will ever take their place. The answer in this case seems 
obvious to me: interaction per se. Presence may in fact manifest itself in and endlessly new 
fashion if it is not forced to remain within any given hypothesis of constancy, such as custom 
and style, and it is instead allowed to make itself present as event (Ereignis). […] the 
comprehension of the world as interaction of ways of being is the necessary prerequisite to a 
healing of the fracture between thought and feeling.' (p. 312) 
 
Norberg-Schulz concludes that there are three characteristics of such an approach in 
architecture: 
1. imprint: respecting the location, the genius loci, and connected customs; 
2. composition: respecting the history, subjected to various interpretations of the 
genius loci; contributing to the self-realisation of the place by fitting the part into 
the whole; 
3. intervention: contributing to the identity of the place by making it present in the 
landscape, making use of delimitation. 
In this way, unity precedes the parts and thus the art of place is made possible on a 
phenomenological basis. 
 
'The term "self-realisation" implies that the process of interaction, which reveals the life of 
place, is unstoppable. But the term also means that place must preserve its identity through 
change, which is to say that it remains the same even if it is never identical. This is an 
intrinsic quality of the original and at the same time new art of being, always in the process 
of becoming. Already we can see its plan, elevation and outline, but what is still lacking is 
that phenomenological understanding that can fill its vague projections with a qualitative 
content. When this happens, the art of place will become the art of experience of living.' (p. 
356) 
 
Critical discussion of Norberg-Schulz's approach 
 
Apart from considerations about the quality of the English translation32 and the 
structure of the work as a whole, there are some other interesting points of discussion 
that appear from the book by Norberg-Schulz. 
 
Firstly, the phenomenological background and Norberg-Schulz's conception of the 
lifeworld. I think the idea of the world as interaction of ways of being is very 
valuable. However, one cannot just take this as a point of departure and then fill it in 
with Husserl's concept of the lifeworld, especially because Norberg-Schulz uses it as 
 
32 I kind of regret that I did not purchase the original Norwegian text instead. I encourage everyone 
capable of understanding either Norwegian or Italian to buy the book in one of these languages; both 
versions were written by the author himself. 
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opposed to scientification, whereas for Husserl the lifeworld forms the basis of just 
this scientific knowledge. Norberg-Schulz argues against the quantification and 
egocentricity that characterise the scientific approach. However, the problem is not 
one that requires substitution of the lifeworld for science, but one that requires 
acknowledgement of the lifeworld as the foundation of science. Husserl saw this, 
whereas Norberg-Schulz at least implicitly suggests an anti-scientific tendency. 
 
A pragmatic view on scientific knowledge establishes the methods of science as one 
"way of being" instead of an attempt to fix the world in quantities. The substantialistic 
tendency of science in the ontological phase of our culture can no longer be an 
argument for rehabilitation of the lifeworld, since in a functional worldview such a 
critique is obsolete. The threat is no longer a substantialistic one, but an 
operationalistic one. Phenomenology cannot prevent substantialism; if it tries anyway, 
it will substitute scientific substantialism with lifeworld substantialism, as Norberg-
Schulz seems to do. It can however prevent the negative tendency of operationalism 
of the functional phase, by providing a worldview in terms of interactions of ways of 
being instead of merely mechanical interactions of systems. 
 
Secondly, the role of precognition. Norberg-Schulz considers precognition, which 
enables the recognition of the Gestalten, as something a priori, but it does not become 
quite clear what that means. The language through which the precognition occurs is 
obviously a priori with regard to a single act of identification of a place. But seen in 
the whole of experience, this precognition is rather rooted in habit than in something 
fundamental to human experience. Of course, the bodily capabilities should enable 
such a precognition, but the actual distinction of the Gestalten depends largely on 
previous experiences. Our coverage of Norberg-Schulz's theory should therefore not 
be interpreted as a return to the transcendental approach. 
The concept of similarity in Norberg-Schulz's approach to architecture, serving as 
the root of the Gestalten principles, apparently is the same similarity as in case-based 
reasoning. Therefore, the Gestalten principles in implementation make possible the 
comprehension of the place by allowing the precognition to be relevant for the present 
situation, since something is similar and therefore can be identified by precognition. 
Precognition is therefore actually a priori to scientific perception, but as to lifeworld 
perception, it is rather something referring to similarity of the present situation to 
previous experiences, as in case-based reasoning. This similarity is established by 
habits that consist of identification on the one side, and orientation on the other. The 
Gestalten principles therefore guide the implementation as to make comprehension 
possible, by forcing the similarity upon the environment, instead of geometric 
organisation, which apparently lacks such criteria. 
 
Thirdly, the role of customs and style. I agree with Norberg-Schulz that the fracture of 
thought and feeling manifests itself in a separation between customs and style in 
design. However, this problem is not simply solved by conceiving the world as 
interaction of ways of being and thereby seemingly forgetting about customs and style 
altogether, even though these two aspects formed the whole of human culture up till 
now. It will be more fruitful if customs and style can be understood as interactions of 
ways of being themselves. This corresponds to what a pragmatic phenomenological 
approach makes possible, by distinguishing different ways of relating to the 
environment. Customs thereby correspond to the praxis, made possible by habits, and 
style corresponds to the practices of abstract knowledge, made possible by modelling. 
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The pragmatic phenomenological approach thus does not substitute interaction for 
customs and style, but conceives interaction as the basis which enables both these 
ways of relating to the world. 
 
Fourthly, Norberg-Schulz does not distinguish between hermeneutic and existential 
aspects of the relation between humans and their environment. Because of this, the 
relation between various important concepts does not become clear. The relation 
between memory, identification and orientation, for example, can be explained better 
if we notice that identification represents the hermeneutic aspect of the use of place, 
and orientation the existential aspect. The same goes for the concepts of 
comprehension and implementation, which refer to intellectual rather than habitual 
interpretation and action. If we understand these concepts as representing hermeneutic 
and existential aspects, the concepts are very valuable to a pragmatic phenomenology 
of environmental planning, as we will see in the next part of the chapter. 
 
What Norberg-Schulz actually does is take the phenomenological concept of the 
lifeworld and use it to describe what we call the praxis. Whereas Ihde focuses on 
microperception (sensory bodily relation) and macroperception (explicit cultural or 
scientific models), Norberg-Schulz strongly defends the praxis against the over-
emphasis on these aspects. This may explain the anti-scientific connotations that 
appear from his work. The value of his theory lies not in the rejection of science, but 
in the recognition of the praxis as something worth discussing for its own sake. 
Including this aspect in the pragmatic phenomenological approach yields a more 
balanced view, and the extensive coverage of Norberg-Schulz's theory should suffice 
to make this point. 
 
The pragmatic phenomenological model: 
three aspects of intentionality 
 
In the preceding text, we described the phenomenology of architecture as advanced by 
Christian Norberg-Schulz. Although the way in which he tries to use 
phenomenological thought is very different from ours, he manages to give a valuable 
phenomenological analysis of our habitual relation to the world. The main points of 
discussion have been covered above. We conclude that Norberg-Schulz, by focusing 
on the lifeworld within his phenomenological approach, offers the concepts for a 
phenomenological description of the praxis, i.e. the continuous realisation of a social 
reality. 
We have seen how a phenomenological description of the praxis is possible by an 
overview and critical discussion of Norberg-Schulz's theory. The final goal of the 
theoretical part of this project is to provide a framework and vocabulary for pragmatic 
phenomenological analysis. We will do this by first developing descriptions of three 
aspects of intentionality, including the associated vocabulary and the possibilities of 
mediation, and then integrating the three aspects into a single framework. The main 
idea of our approach is to view the three aspects of directedness as associated with 
modes of selectivity. The descriptions of the three aspects are based on the three 
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modes of selectivity we distinguished (in terms of models, situations, and perceptual-
sensory contents), guided by the analysis of the artificial intelligence paradigms. 
 
Within the signal-based mode of selectivity we can refer to intentionality as 
directedness towards signals. The processing of these signals forms the relation 
between the processes of experience and acting. When we look at humans we find 
reflexes and instincts as relations with the environment that solely rely on this aspect 
of intentionality. This aspect, however, contains all directedness towards signals, and 
thereby includes vision as such. Mediation may for example occur by a telescope that 
transforms the signals the body receives. 
 
When we look at the case-based mode of selectivity, we find ourselves at the level 
that we usually are referring to when we speak of "experience". A situation is 
interpreted in terms of previously encountered similar cases, and based on solutions 
applied in the past, a solution for the new situation is constructed. In the comparison 
of situations and solutions to those situations, experience and acting are connected. 
This enables the realisation of a social reality, in which meaning is shared by sharing 
habits. We introduced the term praxis for this. As we have seen, Norberg-Schulz 
describes the praxis from a phenomenological point of view. According to Norberg-
Schulz, relating to the environment in the praxis requires memory, identification of 
the situation, and orientation in the situation. Identification refers to the hermeneutic 
aspect of the relation (interpretation), and orientation to the existential aspect (acting). 
Directedness towards situations is the characteristic of this aspect of intentionality. 
This mode represents the level of the lifeworld, which phenomenology introduced as 
a world of experience prior to and underlying scientific experience. The analysis is 
enriched, however, by also including the other modes of selectivity. 
 
When explicit models of the world in terms of abstract concepts are involved, another 
mode of selectivity applies. The associated directedness is towards the environment as 
described by models, which are at the same time applied and adapted to the new 
experience. Within computer science this is modelled by applying rules to new 
information (deduction), and discovering rules from examples (induction). The 
connection between interpretation in terms of the models and application of the rules 
of the model forms the link between hermeneutic and existential aspects here. 
Norberg-Schulz uses the terms comprehension and implementation for these aspects 
of understanding and design. Whereas identification and orientation serve as the 
hermeneutic and existential components of the praxis, comprehension and 
implementation apply when we understand and design something based on models. 
Comprehension refers to the interpretation of the environment in terms of models; 
implementation to the application of a solution provided by a model to the 
environment. To be able to use models, the environment must be seen as instantiation 
of the models that are used. Directedness towards model instances is the characteristic 
here. 
 
The concepts from the work of Norberg-Schulz that are especially relevant here are 
identification and orientation, being the hermeneutic and the existential components 
of our relation to the environment within the praxis. We will also use the concepts of 
comprehension and implementation for describing an intellectual way of relating to 
the environment. Again, these refer to the hermeneutic and existential aspect of the 
relation, respectively. By the description given of Norberg-Schulz's approach, we 
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have provided these concepts with their necessary phenomenological context. 
Although Norberg-Schulz uses phenomenology in a different way than we do, his 
concepts serve to make clear the difference between the social and intellectual aspects 
of our relation to our environment, from a phenomenological point of view. 
 
We introduced three modes of selectivity and the associated aspects of intentionality 
here. Below, all these will described in detail. I will use the term presence here 
instead of the pragmatist concept of existence (something that exists in the world), to 
prevent confusion with the phenomenological concept of existence, referring to the 
existential aspects of our relation to the world. 
 
Bodily intentionality 
 
Bodily intentionality is the directedness of a presence towards the signals it receives 
from its environment. The signals activate the system (e.g. the neurones) and as a 
result, the output signal leads to some change in the environment. In artificial 
intelligence, the associated mode of selectivity is modelled by the paradigm of signal-
based reasoning. 
 
An example is touching something hot. The feeling immediately and unconsciously 
results in pulling back one's hand. This behaviour is evoked by being bodily directed 
towards the signals in the environment. The selectivity with respect to these signals 
indicates a bodily intentionality, which enables signal-based behaviour by signal-
based reasoning. The hermeneutic aspect of intentionality is the way in which the 
signal leads to stimulation of the body, and the existential aspect is the way in which 
this evokes a response of the body. The same kind of intentionality may be ascribed to 
a plant growing towards the light, although the signal processing is not based on 
neurones in that case. 
 
Bodily intentionality is relevant when behaviour can be explained by reference to the 
signal processing only. This is the case with reflexes and instincts, but it fails when 
we want to explain social behaviour. We cannot explain the emergence of habits with 
reference to the neural structure of the organism only. We can of course simulate 
social behaviour of signal-based systems, but for the formation of habits to occur, the 
representation in the neural networks needs to refer to situations and the associated 
actions. In the same sense, humans need to be able to process situations when 
acquiring habits. 
 
Bodily mediation occurs when something in the environment changes the relation 
between signal and receiver, leading to a different stimulation and possibly a different 
response.  
 
Habitual intentionality 
 
When the directedness of the presence to its environment is not only towards signals, 
but towards complex structures representing a situation, we speak of habitual 
intentionality. The signals are no longer treated individually, but as a case. The 
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associated mode of selectivity is modelled by the paradigm of case-based reasoning in 
artificial intelligence. 
 
Combinations of signals that are relevant to the representation of the case are called 
signs. Signs influence the reasoning by indicating aspects of previously encountered 
situations. We use the terminology from Norberg-Schulz to describe the hermeneutic 
and existential aspects of habitual intentionality. The hermeneutic aspect is the 
identification of the situation in terms of previous experiences, the existential aspect is 
the orientation in the situation based on the actions performed in previously 
encountered situations. 
 
As an illustration of the relation between signs and signals, we may again use an 
insight from computer science. Nake (1994) distinguishes in the context of user 
interfaces of computers between a sign process and a signal process. The sign process 
is the meaningful dialogue between the machine and the user, the signal process the 
reduction of this interaction to symbol manipulation within the device. Signs are thus 
part of a process of social practices, whereas signals operate on the electronic or 
biological configurations on which the sign processes "run". 
 
Habitual mediation occurs when something in the environment changes the relation 
between the situation and the involved presence, leading to a different identification 
of the situation and possibly a different orientation. 
 
Habitual intentionality is relevant when behaviour can be explained by reference to 
the processing of situations as such. This is the case with all kinds of habits and 
common social conduct. When the situation is not experienced as such, but as an 
instantiation of an abstract model of the environment, we need a different kind of 
explanation. 
 
Intellectual intentionality 
 
When models are involved in the relation to the environment, we speak of intellectual 
intentionality. The models enable rational reasoning about the environment and 
behaving accordingly. The associated mode of selectivity is modelled by the paradigm 
of model-based reasoning in artificial intelligence. 
 
When referring to a model, the present situation is not seen as a case as such, but as an 
exemplar of the involved model. The situation must therefore be explained in terms of 
the model; be interpreted as an instance of the model. The signs constituting the case 
are represented by symbols in the model: abstract terms referring to a feature of the 
concrete exemplars. 
 
Intellectual intentionality consists of comprehension as the hermeneutic aspect and 
implementation as the existential aspect. The presence is directed to aspects of its 
environment indicating exemplars of abstract models. By comprehending the 
exemplar in terms of a model, interpretation is possible, and models may be adjusted 
to fit this particular exemplar. The model may then indicate a solution to the posed 
problem, and by implementation this solution can be applied to the environment. 
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Intellectual mediation occurs when something in the environment changes the way in 
which the environment is comprehended, or the way in which a solution is 
implemented in the environment. Intellectual mediation may in this way change the 
models that are used to describe the environment. 
 
A pragmatic phenomenological vocabulary 
 
The pragmatic phenomenological vocabulary, which we will summarise here, is based 
on three main concepts. We started with a discussion of phenomenology as a means to 
focus on relations instead of on an objectified environment from a spectator position. 
Phenomenology provided the concepts of intentionality (directedness towards the 
environment) and mediation (influencing of the relation by things in the 
environment). Pragmatism made it possible to discuss social aspects in terms of 
habits, and it provided the concept of selectivity (bias / preferences in behaviour). 
The richness of both approaches should be clear from the discussion in the 
concerning chapters, and it is exactly this richness that makes the concepts function as 
something more than just another description of things we already knew. 
Phenomenology, especially postphenomenology, allows us to recognise that our 
experience is neither subjective nor objective, and that it arises in our relation to our 
environment. Pragmatism explains how the things we do emerge from how we 
interact with our environment, instead of from rational decisions of a spectator. 
The discussion of the work of Norberg-Schulz made it possible to focus on the 
praxis (in which social practices are based on habits), while maintaining a 
phenomenological vocabulary. The directedness towards the environment is covered 
in the terms identification and orientation, more than in the concept of habits itself. 
These terms also allow us to discuss hermeneutic and existential aspects of habitual 
intentionality. 
 
We have described three aspects of intentionality based on the three different modes 
of selectivity we derived from the artificial intelligence paradigms. In bodily 
intentionality, the selective behaviour of an existence is based on signals, in habitual 
intentionality it is based on cases, and in intellectual intentionality it is based on 
models. By relating the different aspects of intentionality to the corresponding modes 
of selectivity, we do not need to have three intentional relations instead of one, but we 
acknowledge that the intentional relation includes different aspects, based on different 
modes of selectivity. 
 
 bodily habitual intellectual 
mode of selectivity signal-based case-based model-based 
directedness to signals cases model-instances 
hermeneutic aspect stimulation identification comprehension 
existential aspect response orientation implementation 
    
unit of interpretation signal sign symbol 
interpreted structure  case exemplar 
reference of interpretation   model 
 
Table 6.1: Pragmatic phenomenological vocabulary: aspects of intentionality 
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The different aspects of intentionality, corresponding to the modes of selectivity, have 
been explained above. The difference between signals, signs and symbols is 
something that has been analysed very differently by various authors. Here, the 
concepts refer to the units of interpretation in the different modes of selectivity. A 
sign is an indication of something previously experienced, whereas a symbol is a 
representation of a characteristic within a model. This means that when a situation is 
experienced as an exemplar of a model, the symbols in the model are used to 
represent the signs in the situation. For example, the presence of water may be a sign 
indicating aspects of previous experiences, whereas in scientific analysis, the symbol 
H2O is used to represent the presence of water. Or in a landscape, the presence of a 
footpath may refer to previous experiences of hiking, but it may also be represented 
by a symbol in a model if one is drawing a map of the area. 
 
The concepts of amplification / reduction of aspects of experience and invitation / 
inhibition of aspects of action as defined in postphenomenology can be applied in 
pragmatic phenomenology as well. They can now be applied for each of the three 
aspects of intentionality, corresponding to the three modes of selectivity. For example 
– in habitual intentionality – the presence of marked hiking trails may amplify the 
interpretation of the situation in terms of following a fixed route, and it may invite 
following marked trails in different areas. It may reduce the interpretation of the 
situation in terms of different possible routes and inhibit exploration behaviour. 
 
With respect to the current postphenomenological concepts of micro- and 
macroperception, we explicitly added a means to discuss social aspects in terms of 
habitual intentionality and habitual mediation. The distinction between micro- and 
macroperception has taken a very different form in our approach. We now speak of 
different aspects of intentionality, associated with different modes of selectivity. All 
aspects involve an active relation with the environment, as opposed to the contextual 
understanding of macroperception in current postphenomenology. This makes it 
possible to distinguish between three different kinds of mediation. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We propose a philosophical approach in environmental planning that focuses on 
interaction in terms of selective behaviour instead of on subjects and objects. The 
relation of an existence with its environment is characterised by intentionality 
(directedness towards the environment) and selectivity (bias / preferences in both 
experience and action). The hermeneutic perspective describes selectivity of 
experience, and the existential perspective describes selectivity of action. Because the 
concept of selectivity makes it unnecessary to separate man from nature, this 
approach avoids having its roots in the autonomisation process of the Renaissance. 
Therefore, the interaction of man and nature – or man and landscape – is more 
fundamentally conceptualised here than in approaches that assume a subject-object 
distinction, and the spectator conception of experience is avoided.  
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We could also have tried to re-integrate man and landscape – i.e. challenge the 
dominance of objectified physical nature – by trying to find some forgotten hidden 
dimension in the world of things, instead of focusing on interaction. But from a 
pragmatic perspective on philosophy, this is taking a step back towards an apologetic, 
ontological phase of philosophy. This may explain why such attempts often resulted 
in failure (e.g. all kinds of anti-scientific developments). The new task of philosophy 
is a different one. We should provide means for directing, guiding, processes of 
change. This is exactly what the pragmatic phenomenological approach wants to 
achieve, without claiming necessity of any kind. 
 
The pragmatic phenomenological approach distinguishes between three aspects of 
intentionality: directedness towards sensory content in bodily perception, directedness 
towards situations or cases in the praxis, and directedness towards logically 
objectified phenomena (exemplars of models) in scientific inquiry, both natural 
science and social science including morals. The theory of the three aspects of 
directedness should not be seen as a metaphysical claim, but as a pragmatic tool for 
directing environmental developments. By investigating the associated different kinds 
of mediation, decision making in environmental planning can be more sensitive to the 
actual relations between people and the landscape. 
The main difference between the last two kinds of directedness – towards cases 
and towards explicit models – is that in selective behaviour based on cases, there is no 
role for an explicit model of the changes that are invoked. The model is implicit in the 
use of previous experiences. This distinction reflects the critique on 
postphenomenology mentioned before, and the model can hereby provide a better way 
of explaining intersubjectivity than current postphenomenology, by reference to habits 
and learning by imitation. 
 
By focusing on modes of selectivity within intentionality, pragmatic phenomenology 
provides a different access to human-world relations than postphenomenology. In 
postphenomenology, relations are understood from the mutual constitution of subject 
and object. In pragmatic phenomenology, relations are understood from the mutual 
constitution of selectivity between existences. 
 
The advantages of the combined approach over pragmatic or phenomenological 
approaches have already been mentioned. Phenomenology prevents pragmatism from 
an operationalistic connotation by the concept of intentionality, which means a 
perspective "from the inside" by describing the directedness of an existence towards 
its environment. Also, phenomenology elucidates processes of mediation, and 
hermeneutic and existential aspects of selectivity. These concepts now function in 
selectivity-based directedness, instead of in a subject-object relation. On the other 
side, pragmatism prevents phenomenology from transcendental claims and it 
elucidates the praxis as something different from both perceptual human-world 
relations and directedness towards logically objectified phenomena. 
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Chapter 7    
 
Application of the  
pragmatic phenomenological 
approach 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, some cases of concrete developments in environmental planning are 
analysed using the pragmatic phenomenological approach and vocabulary developed 
in the previous chapters. We start with some example cases that illustrate the benefits 
of the pragmatic phenomenological approach. Then, we will look back upon the issue 
of fragmentation that we discussed in chapter 2. We will evaluate the contribution this 
thesis can make to the discussion about the issue. In the end, we will give some 
suggestions about how to integrate pragmatic phenomenological ideas in the practices 
and politics of landscape design. 
 
Cases 
The Case of the Longest Tunnel 
 
New infrastructure, both in the mountains and in the lowlands of the Netherlands, 
often contains tunnels. Tunnel security has recently been given attention in the media 
due to multiple accidents in the long road tunnels in the Alps. In Norway, the world's 
longest road tunnel was opened in 200033. 
 
 
'[…] the King of Norway cut the ribbon for the opening of the world's longest road tunnel 
between Lærdal and Aurland on November 27, 2000. […] The Lærdal Tunnel was built 
during a five-year period from 1995-2000 at a cost of approximately 125 million U.S. dollars. 
It is an important link in the ferry-free road connection between the Bergen area and Eastern 
Norway, including Oslo, and is especially significant for winter traffic, when the high 
mountain passes are closed, or subject to closing, because of snow. […] This tunnel is not 
only the world's longest, 24.5 km ( 15.2 miles), but also the world's most uniquely 
constructed tunnel with exceptional security features. […] 
 
The following are some of the exceptional security measures taken in case of accidents 
and/or fire:  
 
 
 
33 Arne Brekke, The world´s longest road tunnel: Laerdal - Aurland,  
http://www.bergen-guide.com/538.htm 
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- Emergency phones marked SOS have been placed every 250 meters (820 feet)  
- Fire extinguishers have been placed every 125 meters (410 feet), which is closer than in 
other tunnels  
- Stop lights and signs reading: snu og køyr ut, "turn and drive out", go on when one of the 
emergency phones is used  
- 15 turning areas have been constructed for buses and semi-trailers  
- […] emergency niches have been built every 500 meters (1640 feet)  
- Emergency phone channels for police, fire departments and hospitals  
- Data connections to night-watch and security centers in Lærdal and Bergen  
- Special wiring for the use of radio and mobile phones  
- Photo inspection and counting of all vehicles entering and exiting the tunnel' 
 
 
Next to these security measures, attention has also been paid to the behaviour of 
drivers in the tunnel. 
 
 
'In order to break the monotony of a 20-minute drive, the tunnel has been divided up into four 
sections by creating three large caverns, or mountain halls, 6 km (3.7 miles) from each end 
and one in the middle. Special attention has been paid to the lighting. Whereas white light is 
used in the tunnel itself, the mountain halls are equipped with blue and yellow light. This 
gives one the illusion of driving into daylight every 6 km (3.7 miles), and the golden light 
along the floor gives the illusion of sunrise! To keep the drivers from being inattentive or 
falling asleep, and thus causing head-on collisions, each lane is supplied with a loud rumble 
strip toward the center!' 
 
 
At Sintef, a Norwegian institute for applications of science and technology, research 
has been done into means for comforting people in tunnels34. 
 
 
'Green plants cover the rock walls. The emergency telephone flashes a red signal of warmth 
towards you. You have passed the yellow section in the tunnel and you know that only 200 
metres remains. Relaxing music plays on the pre-set channel on the car radio.  
 
This is not the scenario that we usually connect with tunnels, which instead often promotes a 
feeling of tension, fear and unpleasantness. […] The Sogn and Fjordane county office of 
'Statens Vegvesen', the national highway authority, has taken the fear of tunnels seriously. It 
will lead the way with 'psychologically correct tunnels' when the 25 kilometre long Lærdal 
Tunnel opens in 2001. Researchers at SINTEF Civil and Environmental Engineering have 
been given the task of evaluating efforts to suppress the feeling of unpleasantness.' 
 
 
Thus, the design of the tunnel can influence the way in which people experience the 
environment. From a phenomenological point of view, this effect can be described in 
terms of mediation. How can this insight be used in actual tunnel construction? 
 
 
'Last August, the institute [SINTEF] invited leading drama advisers, architects and theatre 
lightning technicians to a seminar in Trondheim to suggest solutions for increasing the 
comfort in tunnels. The idea of widening tunnels was high on the list. Modelling tunnels in a 
shape of a trumpet that would increase the width at the entrance, exit and other strategic 
points within the tunnel, would create a useful tool for breaking up longer tunnels. The 
Lærdal Tunnel, for instance, could be divided into four sections, each six kilometres in 
 
34 Åse Dragland, Comfort in the tunnel, http://www.ntnu.no/gemini/1998-01E/20.html 
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length. In addition to being an ''architectural breathing space", it would provide police with 
possibilities for speed control and video surveillance. Providing they are located on straight 
stretches with good visibility, the spaces could also serve as turning bays.  
Light, space and air are basic necessities. ''If you drive in a tunnel with poor ventilation, it 
reduces your feeling of safety and you could put all the best art in the world on the tunnel 
walls, but it wouldn't make any difference'', says traffic researcher Gunnar D. Jenssen of 
SINTEF Civil and Environmental Engineering.' 
 
 
Here, we observe the postphenomenological concept of reduction of aspects of 
experience. Mediation may take place by amplifying or reducing aspects of 
experience, and inviting or inhibiting aspects of action. In our pragmatic 
phenomenological approach, these effects may be described for the three aspects of 
mediation, based on the three different modes of selectivity. Which are the most 
important mediators in tunnels, and how can these be understood from our 
perspective? 
 
 
'Good lighting is seen by the experts as an extremely important tool. For example, creating 
illusionary room effects and perceptual illusions, such as illuminated lines of columns, to 
make the tunnel feel larger. According to Jensen, ''The lighter and more spacious a tunnel is, 
the safer the driver feels.''  
Tools which can create a sense of safety, are second highest on the list of tunnel 'musts', 
followed by a consideration of cognitive factors such as: ''Where am I?" and ''How much 
further do I have to go?" Aesthetics, neatness and artistic decoration were lowest on the list 
of factors. One suggestion given consideration was putting plants into the tunnel. ''The logic 
is if they are able to live in a tunnel, then I must be able to as well."  
 
''Using the nature as decoration on tunnel walls is one tool. Colour coding in the tunnel is 
another," says Jenssen. ''Psychologists can advise which colours are best and in which order 
they should be used. Green, for example, is a colour that has agreeable and pleasant effects 
on people, creating a feeling of safety and showing that everything is all right. Experiments 
have been carried out at the Gudvangen Tunnel using green lights near the tunnel entrance. 
The results suggest that this signal tended to increase the feeling of safety for drivers."  
Jenssen sees the possibility using different colour codes in different parts of the tunnel to help 
motorists to determine where they are in the tunnel and the number of kilometres remaining 
before they are once again back in the open air.  
Statements like ''we are now in the yellow section" could be useful information too when it is 
necessary to make emergency calls from inside the tunnel.' 
 
 
In safety issues for tunnels, mediation can be used as a way to change the relation 
between people and their environment. Different types of mediation may apply. 
Bodily mediation occurs when the bodily aspects of the drivers' intentionality are 
changed by the environment (signal-based selectivity). Habitual mediation occurs 
when the environment influences the drivers' identification and orientation (case-
based selectivity). Intellectual mediation occurs when the environment changes the 
way in which the driver comprehends the abstract concept of a tunnel (model-based 
selectivity). 
 
In the above texts, we can clearly distinguish between a signalling aspect of mediating 
technologies and a sign aspect. Signals include change of light and the sound of the 
rumble strip in the middle of the road. The signalling aspect is used to keep drivers 
alert. Signs include colours that mediate the relation between the drivers and their 
environment by association with previous experiences. When green has always been 
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experienced in situations of safety, it may serve as a sign for safety. The sign aspect is 
used to give drivers the feeling of safety. 
As explained in the pragmatic phenomenological model in the previous chapter, 
the signalling aspect leads to bodily mediation and the sign aspect to habitual 
mediation. When a rumble strip or a change of light reinforces the driver's attention, 
this is a kind of bodily mediation. When the use of colours, plants or illusionary room 
effects reminds the driver of previous experiences of safety – and at the same time 
creates a new experience for future reference – this is a kind of habitual mediation. 
The former realises mediation by changing the aspects of stimulation and response, 
the latter by changing the aspects of identification and orientation. 
It may be argued that colours mediate by signals rather than by signs, i.e. bodily 
rather than habitually. If a colour is biologically connected to an instinctual reaction 
of the body, this is indeed true. Colours can therefore be seen as mediating both the 
bodily and the habitual intentionality, depending on the context. In any case, the 
distinction between the two types is still valid in the tunnel example, since a green 
light is connected to previous experiences anyway, which is different from the bodily 
reaction of being alert at light changes or the rumble sound. 
 
But what about the intellectual mediation, and the associated symbolic aspect? The 
innovative design of the Lærdal tunnel may become an exemplar of an abstract model 
of a tunnel. In that way, the comprehension of the concept of a tunnel is changed, 
which may influence the implementation of future projects. This aspect will be 
discussed more extensively in the case on ecoducts later in this chapter. 
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Figure 7.1: Keeping the drivers awake in the world's longest road tunnel 
Source: http://home.no.net/lotsberg/data/norway/laerdal/tunnel.html 
 
 
Figure 7.2: The ecoduct at Terlet near Arnhem, the Netherlands  
(case text on p. 79 and further) 
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The Case of the Reconstruction of Roombeek 
 
Meijberg (2002) investigated the material conditions of public space from the 
perspective of mediation. Public space, as opposed to private space, should be 'a place 
where one can meet strangers and people with different opinions, a place where one 
establishes social commitment.'35 The example she uses is the reconstruction of the 
district of Roombeek in the Dutch city of Enschede, which was destroyed in the 
fireworks factory disaster of May 2000. The question she asks in this example is if the 
reconstruction plans offer the material conditions for the emergence of a lively urban 
public space in the newly built district. 
 
Meijberg analyses the spatial organisation of the district as a way to achieve an 
integrated living environment for different social classes. She does this using 
mediation as a central concept. Unfortunately, the richness of the 
postphenomenological vocabulary does not become visible in the presented analysis. 
The question is why the postphenomenological approach seems to fail here and how 
we can provide a better presentation of the example. 
 
As we discussed before, the postphenomenological approach did not yet provide tools 
for analysing the social aspects of the intentional relation. Since a discussion of public 
space inherently involves these aspects, a postphenomenological analysis of the 
material conditions of public space is hardly possible without additional conceptual 
distinctions. With the pragmatic phenomenological concepts introduced in this thesis, 
we can attempt a new description of the material conditions that enable the emergence 
of a public space in the district of Roombeek. These conditions include the urban 
environment, and are therefore important to environmental planning. 
 
The essential feature in our new analysis of the example is the introduction of the 
concepts of habits and habitual mediation. Habitual intentionality describes the social 
aspects of the relation between people and their environment in terms of habits. When 
it comes to the material conditions of public space, the relation between the design of 
the environment and the lives of people can be described from this social perspective 
in pragmatic phenomenology. The design influences the social behaviour of people by 
mediating their identification and orientation. Thereby, new habits may be formed 
which change the social structure. 
 
When, for example, designers try to increase integration between different social 
groups – by building different types of housing within the same district, or by 
concentrating different functions within the same central building (education, day 
care, club life, sports, working places) – this influences the identification of the 
situation and the orientation in the situation by people who live in the district. When 
one goes to one's own club, and it is situated in a building with all kinds of different 
clubs, the identification of the situation involves these other clubs. Thereby, the 
orientation of people also involves these other societies, which may lead to social 
integration. In the case-based mode of selectivity habits have changed, and public 
space is strengthened. 
 
 
35 p. 71, my translation 
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Meijberg mentions several other aspects that may stimulate the appearance of a public 
space: intermixing of living and working, concentration of people in central areas, 
availability of fast Internet connections and (public) transport facilities. All these can 
be described by habitual mediation. Certain aspects of identification are amplified or 
reduced, and certain aspects of orientation are invited or inhibited. In identification, 
the presence of other people may be amplified, and in orientation, the involvement in 
new social contacts may be invited. Habitual mediation leads to changed habits. Thus, 
the way in which the district is designed may change the social behaviour of people, 
and therefore contribute to the emergence of a lively public space. 
 
We see here how hermeneutic aspects (identification) and existential aspects 
(orientation) co-operate in the mediation of the social aspects of the relation between 
people and their environment. The concept of habitual intentionality – including the 
associated concepts of habitual mediation, identification and orientation – makes it 
possible to describe the material conditions of public space in (pragmatic) 
phenomenological terms. Whereas current postphenomenology cannot apply 
mediation as something that involves social aspects, our approach explicitly mentions 
these aspects, and thereby enriches the analysis. The material conditions mediate the 
social aspects of intentionality, and thereby change the way in which the environment 
is present for people (identification), and the way in which people exist in their 
environment (orientation). The concept of habits makes it possible to understand this 
effect: people experience situations differently, and act differently in these situations 
(case-based selectivity). 
 
The Case of the Disappearing Trees 
 
The last couple of decades, newly gained interest in "nature" has lead to increased 
knowledge and consciousness on how humanity has been treating nature. In the 
Netherlands, we know that the whole of the Veluwe (our largest forest area) was once 
covered with a virgin forest of oaks and birches. When the forests were cut down for 
human use, heath developed on which sheep roamed around. But even this vegetation 
disappeared due to too intensive use, and the sand started to drift and even covered 
villages. The threat was eliminated by reforesting the area, especially with conifers, 
which grow faster and which were of great importance to the mining industry (for 
supporting the mine galleries). Meanwhile, the last virgin forest in the Netherlands 
had been cut down near Beekbergen in 1870. 
When new interest in nature arose in the last decades, people became dissatisfied 
with the "pine fields", and argued for a more natural forest management. This 
included stimulating natural regeneration instead of clear-cut foresting, combining 
natural, economic and recreational values, and striving towards indigenous tree 
species. All large organisations involved in forest management have to some extent 
implemented these new insights. The actual implementation depends on the overall 
goals of the organisation and the specific goals set for each area. The new "model" of 
a forest is one of variation instead of homogeneity.  
 
One of the issues involved in this implementation is how to stimulate the development 
of a more natural forest. One solution is to gradually remove exotic trees when they 
have enough economic value. The empty spaces can then fill up with indigenous 
species (although exotic ones will reappear as well). A more rigid solution is to get rid 
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of all exotic trees at once. There have been a few reports in the media about plans in 
the latter direction. It will not be a surprise that these efforts evoked lots of protests 
among locals. A case which I have not seen in the media, but experienced myself is 
"het Deelerwoud" near Arnhem (figure 7.3). 
The area, property of Natuurmonumenten, a Dutch organisation for nature 
preservation, is largely covered with pine trees and heath. Natuurmonumenten 
announced to strive for "an indigenous forest as natural as possible" in the area. The 
model was quite clear. However, people do not experience the area as "a forest in 
process of becoming more natural" when they take a walk there. Identification and 
orientation are based on comparison of the situation with previous experiences. 
Especially near the parking lot were huge Douglas spruces, and these served as a 
major factor in the identification of the area. In the winter of 2001-2002, these all 
disappeared at once. Apparently, the tendency towards a more natural forest had to be 
forced. Of course people could understand what the idea was when they read the signs 
that were placed around the area. Nonetheless, identification and orientation may have 
failed because of the radically changed situation. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: The removal of spruces to make room for a more natural forest (on 
the left, forestry of Ugchelen-Hoenderloo) and the result after one and a half 
year (on the right, Deelerwoud) 
 
We can see here that an intellectual explanation (in terms of a model) does not always 
suffice when explaining environmental developments. The conflict between 
comprehension-implementation and identification-orientation is very well visible in 
this case. The explanation for the interventions is quite clear, but the case-based 
mediation makes identification and orientation impossible without understanding of 
such a rational explanation. 
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But habitual mediation of course may take more subtle forms. Every change in a 
landscape is capable of altering the relation between people and situations such that 
behaviour changes. In the above case, people may find a different parking lot for a 
picnic in the shade, or adapt to the new situation by exploration behaviour: 
intentionally storing new cases in memory that represent the changed situation. 
 
We already discussed the issue of hiking trails in the third chapter. There, we 
concluded that the appearance of marked hiking trails in a national park influences the 
social practices of hiking, both by changing the situation and by offering a different 
situation to refer to in future experience. We can now refer to this kind of mediation 
as habitual mediation. From our phenomenological perspective, it is not just a change 
of observable habits, but also a change in the relation between people and their 
environment in terms of identification and orientation. The landscape becomes 
present for the involved people in a different way. 
 
The Case of the Emergence of Network Nature 
 
When the A50 highway between Arnhem and Apeldoorn was planned in the eighties, 
nature preservation organisations were furious. If the highway was necessary at all, it 
should be built around the forest area of the Veluwe, not straight through it. But 
decisions were made anyway. For compensation, nature was given two "ecoducts", 
fauna passages, over the new highway. These ecoducts connect the south-eastern part 
of the Veluwe, including Veluwezoom national park, with the nature reserve 
Deelerwoud in the west and the forestry of Ughelen-Hoenderloo in the north-west 
(figure 7.2, p. 75). These ecoducts, built during the construction of the highway in the 
late eighties, were the first major fauna passages in the Netherlands. Since then, two 
additional ecoducts have been realised over the A1 highway (near Oldenzaal and 
Kootwijk). 
 
Meanwhile, plans were made for nature management in the Netherlands in general. In 
1990, the nature policy plan formulated the concept of the Ecologische 
Hoofdstructuur (ecological main structure) for the Netherlands.36 The concept 
involves the creation of a continuous structure of nature areas in the Netherlands, 
consisting of core areas and corridors to connect them. These corridors may involve 
fauna passages over roads and railways. The resemblance between the small-scale 
issue of the A50 and the large-scale issue of the nature policy plan is remarkable. It 
seems that the solutions to the concrete problems of the A50 may have influenced 
abstract thinking about nature, and the construction of a model-based framework of 
interpretation. How can we explain this connection from our theory? 
 
When actual fauna passages are built between various essential nature areas, the 
concept of nature as a structure of core areas and connections between them can be 
reinforced. This can be explained by the phenomenological concept of mediation: due 
to actual (technological) changes in the environment, the relation between people and 
their environment is changed. In the case described above, the change involves the 
model of nature that people have. When people experience the actual presence of 
connections between nature areas, comprehension of nature in terms of core areas and 
 
36 Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied (1998, http://www.rlg.nl/adviezen/988.html) 
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connections is amplified, and action in terms of the implementation of such a structure 
is invited. The mediation here takes place on the level of intellectual intentionality. 
The comprehension of nature and the implementation of nature policy are mediated 
by the actual construction of the ecoducts. How strong this connection is in the case 
mentioned above should be investigated in further empirical research, but at least our 
theory offers the concepts to explain such a connection. 
 
When making decisions about the way in which the landscape is arranged, mediation 
may take a more direct form. In the above case, we saw how mediation may change 
our relation to our environment in terms of models. But also habitual mediation can 
occur in cases where we have to make decisions. When a new highway is built, the 
area on both sides of the road is more likely to be interpreted in terms of cases 
(situations) that accompany other highways. When other highways often have 
industrial areas next to them, the new highway may mediate the relation to the 
landscape around it by amplifying interpretation in terms of possibilities for 
establishing industry. When the relation between designers and the landscape is 
mediated in this way, plans in such a direction may actually be developed. 
This effect accounts for part of the resistance against new highways. It is not only 
the "objective" presence of the highway that changes the quality of the landscape, it is 
also the mediation of the relation to the surrounding landscape that is invoked by its 
construction. When this kind of effect is better understood, the discussion on new 
infrastructure may be more to the point than calculations of changes that do not 
involve the concept of mediation. 
 
Fragmentation 
 
As the last case in this chapter, we will return to the problem of fragmentation as 
discussed in chapter 2. The critique on the existing approach to fragmentation was 
that fragmentation of the landscape is seen as an objective condition, which makes it 
impossible to consider the problem of fragmentation in human experience as a 
problem of environmental planning. 
 
We can now, with the distinctions we made between three aspects of intentionality, 
re-evaluate the analysis. What is actually seen as "objective" fragmentation, is 
fragmentation as a problem of the intellectual aspect of the relation between people 
and their environment. We model our environment such that fragmentation becomes a 
problem we can solve within the model. When nature suffers from the fragmentation 
we find in our model of the landscape, we can find solutions within the model in 
terms of reconnection and compensation, and this is what is currently happening. 
Thus, model-based reasoning seems to be the paradigm assumed as the only relevant 
aspect of human behaviour. 
 
Traditionally, human behaviour was understood as the operation of a rational mind 
within a non-rational body. The rational mind then operates according to the 
principles of model-based reasoning. From that point of view, the "loss of place" 
would mean that the actual situation does not match some universal need of humans 
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as rational beings. The loss of place then corresponds to alienation from some kind of 
superior condition. This explanation has rightly been rejected because of its failure to 
understand that the human condition is always changing, and never has prevented 
humans from finding ways to express their thinking nature. 
However, by including the habitual aspect of intentionality, we can explain the loss 
of place as a problem within the associated mode of selectivity itself. It is not 
alienation from a superior condition; it is a failure in case-based reasoning, in the 
selectivity of habitual intentionality. People prefer integrated experience because this 
is the way in which habits, in the aspects of identification and orientation, work. The 
loss of place does not refer to some kind of alienation; it points out the problem that 
occurs when people cannot adequately relate to their environment habitually. 
What we discussed as fragmentation within human experience is fragmentation as 
a problem of the habitual aspect of the intentional relation. When the case-based 
(situation-based) aspects of the relation between people and their environment are 
recognised, model-based reasoning does no longer have a monopoly on human 
behaviour. Instead, attention can be paid to the effects of changes in the environment 
in terms of habitual mediation. 
 
The distinction between "objective" and "subjective" fragmentation thus is exposed as 
a distinction only valid from the spectator conception of experience. From a 
pragmatic phenomenological perspective, which abolishes the spectator conception, 
the adequate distinction is between intellectual and habitual aspects of fragmentation. 
Hermeneutic and existential aspects of the relation between people and their 
environment are present at both levels. Our distinction in terms of intellectual and 
habitual aspects replaces a separation in terms of subjective and objective problems. 
There is nothing purely subjective about a habitual relation to the environment. If 
anything, it is intersubjective. Neither is an intellectual relation to the environment 
purely objective. Model-based reasoning involves the construction of models as well 
as their application, such that different models may lead to a different "objectivity". 
The clue lies in relation, not in separation. 
 
According to Husserl, the lifeworld is always present as the source of experience prior 
to scientific analysis. The lifeworld is not less important than scientific claims 
because it is not "objective"; it is actually more important because it creates the 
conditions necessary for scientific modelling. And when the social practices of the 
lifeworld are involved, mediation of this aspect can be the most important of all. 
 
Fragmentation can not be completely resolved if we only see the "objective" kind of 
fragmentation. We presented an integrated way of thinking about the problem from 
our pragmatic phenomenological perspective. To provide means to take these insights 
into account in the design of the landscape, we will present some considerations for 
environmental planners. 
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Integration in design practices 
 
When a part of a landscape is designed, the relevant question to ask from a pragmatic 
phenomenological point of view is how the change will mediate the relations between 
the people who will use the landscape and their environment. Thus, designers should 
anticipate on the mediation that is involved when designing the landscape. 
 
The pragmatic phenomenological approach distinguishes between three types of 
mediation: bodily mediation, habitual mediation and intellectual mediation. We have 
seen examples of these kinds of mediation in the cases discussed above. The design of 
a tunnel may mediate the bodily relation between drivers and their environment by 
changing the signals the drivers receive. The design of a housing district may mediate 
the habitual relation between the inhabitants and their environment by changing their 
identification and orientation. The construction of an ecoduct may mediate the 
intellectual relation between people and their environment by changing their 
comprehension of nature. The types of mediation can be anticipated in design by 
asking the following questions: 
 
 How does the design mediate the perceptual-bodily relation between people in the 
landscape and their environment? 
 How does the design mediate the habitual relation between people in the 
landscape and their environment? 
 How does the design mediate the intellectual relation between people in the 
landscape and their environment? 
 
When these questions are asked in design, aspects of mediation as discussed in the 
cases can to a certain extend be predicted and thereby the influence of the changes in 
the landscape in the lives of people can be analysed. We can analyse how signals from 
the design influence bodily reactions, how the situations created by the design 
influence habits, and how the exemplar created by the design influences our models of 
our world. 
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Chapter 8   
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis, we have attempted to explore the foundations of a new approach in 
philosophy of environmental planning, called the pragmatic phenomenological 
approach. This means that we have constructed a way of thinking about the relations 
between developments in the landscape and developments in our lives and our 
culture, which is based both on phenomenology and pragmatic philosophy. 
 
In this final chapter, we assess the results of this research and recommendations for 
further investigation and application. First, we will mention some important issues 
involved in the construction of the pragmatic phenomenological approach. 
Background 
 
The observation of different paradigms in artificial intelligence has been a starting 
point for me for a new way of looking towards philosophical issues. As much as case-
based reasoning in computer science has often been regarded as just some other way 
of symbolic reasoning in artificial intelligence (as opposed to connectionist 
approaches (neural networks), which do not use symbols but signals), the dynamics of 
habits seem to have largely been ignored in philosophy. I reckon this to be an over-
emphasis on the rational aspects of human behaviour. Although signal-based 
reasoning already offered an alternative to rational reasoning, this has often been 
reduced to a distinction between material conditions (neurones) and spiritual 
conditions (reasoning). However, we do not live in a Cartesian era anymore. 
Philosophical developments ask for a different view on such distinctions. 
 
Case-based reasoning presumes a certain way of describing the relation between 
intelligent existences and their environment. In philosophy, the same way of thinking 
about relations between humans and their environment can be found in the concept of 
habits. However, many approaches seem to overlook the specific benefit of this 
analysis, and stick to the Cartesian dualism unconsciously. This master's thesis is 
therefore partly meant to introduce the specific issue of case-based reasoning – 
behaviour generation by habit – into systematic phenomenological thinking, without 
pretending to have discovered a new monism in habits. 
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Results 
 
The results of this research have mainly been described in the chapters 6 and 7, where 
we constructed the pragmatic phenomenological approach and described its 
application to environmental planning. The results are based on two conclusions, 
which we already drew in the preceding chapters. The first is that we cannot build a 
phenomenological analysis of our relation to the landscape without taking into 
account the social aspects of this relation. We experience the landscape together with 
other people, and this aspect is essential for understanding the relation (e.g. in the 
Roombeek case). The second is that current postphenomenological approaches do not 
take this aspect into account. Therefore, we extended the postphenomenological 
approach with concepts from pragmatic philosophy, which introduces analysis of 
social aspects in terms of habits. 
 
By reformulating intentionality in terms of selectivity instead of a subject-object 
relation, we were able to incorporate the concept of habits into phenomenological 
analysis. The approach was labelled pragmatic phenomenology. Since human 
selectivity is more complex than selectivity of atoms, we needed different modes of 
selectivity to provide an analysis of human directedness to the world. The selection of 
the different modes of selectivity was based on an overview of paradigms of 
intelligent behaviour in artificial intelligence. Three modes of selectivity were 
distinguished: selectivity based on signals, on cases (habits) and on models. 
 
The correspondence of the different modes of selectivity to aspects of human 
intentionality provided a basis for analysing mediation from a pragmatic 
phenomenological perspective. The concepts of microperception and macroperception 
were re-evaluated, and the correspondence to bodily intentionality (signals) and 
intellectual intentionality (models) was described. The mode of selectivity that was 
missing in postphenomenology – habitual intentionality (cases) – could now be 
incorporated in the analysis. By describing mediation from a pragmatic 
phenomenological perspective, we could distinguish between bodily mediation, 
habitual mediation and intellectual mediation. 
 
The application to cases in environmental planning has shown that it is possible to use 
the pragmatic phenomenological approach to analyse concrete developments in 
landscape design. The advantages with respect to existing approaches are found in the 
possibility of including the social aspects of the relation between people and their 
environment. Moreover, the concept of selectivity enables a coherent framework in 
which all aspects of the intentional relation can be included. For each development in 
the landscape, we can now analyse three different kinds of mediation. 
 
The analysis in terms of mediation makes it possible for designers and policy makers 
to anticipate on the mediating effects of their decisions. In this way, the design of the 
landscape can become more sensitive to the effect that changes have on the way in 
which people experience the landscape and the way in which they act in the 
landscape. 
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Recommendations 
 
The foundations of the pragmatic phenomenological approach have been examined by 
giving an overview of the development of phenomenology and the instrumentalist 
approach of John Dewey. Integration of both movements was based on an analysis of 
the relation between the concepts of intentionality, mediation, selectivity and habits. 
Further research may indicate the possibilities of contributions by other pragmatist 
philosophers. In the end, the further developed foundations of the pragmatic 
phenomenological approach should provide a comprehensive alternative to both 
subject-object thinking and operationalistic views. 
 
To further explore the possibilities and limitations of the pragmatic phenomenological 
approach in environmental planning, some interesting research may be performed in 
the future. Firstly, an extensive case study can indicate possibilities and limitations 
based on the analysis of one main example. The case study should include different 
types of mediation, and should indicate the differences and the coherence between 
them. Secondly, it is possible to further investigate the mediation occurring within the 
relation between designers and the landscape, as opposed to the relation between the 
users and the landscape. As we have seen, certain aspects of the landscape may 
mediate the design of the surrounding area, e.g. the amplification of the interpretation 
as industrial area of the terrain next to highways. 
 
Another aspect that may be further investigated is the consequence of this research for 
artificial intelligence in general and especially virtual environments. In virtual 
environments, agents need to communicate with their virtual environment. The way in 
which humans relate to the landscape can be relevant for modelling these agents. If 
humans relate to the world in different ways, should artificial characters exhibit all 
these ways of relating to the world as well? If so, how can we model agents such that 
all these aspects are taken into account? Thus, the research field that provided 
heuristics for this thesis may itself benefit from the analysis presented here. 
 
I think the contents of this thesis can offer some challenging tasks for further work. I 
encourage anyone to accept these challenges, and build the way to integration in 
design practices, and finally in the landscape itself. 
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Summary 
 
 
This report describes a philosophical approach to issues of environmental planning. 
Although interventions in the landscape are often subject to extensive protests, a 
systematic critique of the presumptions involved in the design is missing. A thorough 
analysis of the issue requires a philosophical point of view. 
 
The limitations of current criticism can be overcome if we can provide an overview of 
the origins of the understanding of the landscape in western culture, and mention 
where a new approach should differ. This overview is derived from Ton Lemaire 
(2002), who sees the western attitude to the landscape as a spectator position. It is 
argued that the influence of the landscape on the lives of people can be better 
understood if we focus on the relation between people and the landscape, instead of 
the landscape as objective structure independent of human experience. 
 
The philosophical foundation for such an approach is found in the movement of 
postphenomenology. Postphenomenology describes the relation between humans and 
their environment in terms of intentionality (directedness towards the environment) 
and mediation (influencing of the relation by other existences, especially 
technologies). However, the postphenomenological approach does not include 
concepts to discuss the social aspects of the relation between people and their 
environment. Since people use the landscape together, and since human experience 
and acting is influenced by the behaviour of others, we have to include social aspects 
in postphenomenological analysis in order to apply it to issues of environmental 
planning. 
 
The main question of this thesis is: How can the postphenomenological method of 
analysis be extended such that it is applicable to evaluation of developments in 
environmental planning, by describing processes of mediation by presences in the 
landscape? 
 
Scientific developments in the twentieth century show the possibility to discuss social 
aspects in terms of habits. A philosophical theory including habits is offered by the 
movement of instrumentalism or pragmatism, of which John Dewey is one of the best 
known and purest representatives. Habits allow an explanation of experience and 
existence including social aspects. Dewey rejects the distinction between subjects and 
objects in philosophy. Instead, he argues that each existence exhibits behaviour based 
on selectivity: bias or preferences in behaviour. Because human selectivity is 
something different from selectivity of atoms, we have to describe different modes of 
selectivity in human behaviour. 
 
The different modes of selectivity are distinguished by an analysis of the paradigms in 
artificial intelligence that model intelligent behaviour. There are three such 
paradigms: signal-based reasoning, case-based reasoning, and model-based reasoning. 
The first explains intelligent behaviour by signal processing, the second by 
remembering situations and applying solutions to new situations, the third by 
interpreting the experience in terms of a model and inferring the required action from 
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the model properties. Signal-based reasoning and model-based reasoning can be 
linked to concepts in postphenomenology. The missing aspect in current 
postphenomenology is case-based reasoning: intelligent behaviour by habit. When we 
introduce this aspect into postphenomenology, we are able to discuss social aspects of 
intentionality and mediation. 
 
To introduce the concept of habits into phenomenological analysis, we have to adapt 
the explanation of the intentional relation in terms of subjects and objects, since 
pragmatism does not allow such a distinction. Instead, we explain the intentional 
relation in terms of the directedness of an existence exhibiting selectivity in behaviour 
towards its environment. Different modes of selectivity indicate different aspects of 
intentionality. We distinguish between bodily intentionality (signals), habitual 
intentionality (cases), and intellectual intentionality (models). Each of these aspects 
enables a different type of mediation: bodily mediation, habitual mediation, and 
intellectual mediation. The new approach is called pragmatic phenomenology. 
 
In the application of our approach to various cases in environmental planning, we 
show the value of the concepts we introduced. In the cases, the conceptual framework 
with the different aspects of mediation is used to describe the effect of changes in the 
landscape on human experience and existence. The discussion of the examples serves 
as an illustration for the results and the possibilities for further research. 
 
The influence of changes in the landscape of human experience and existence can 
now adequately be described in terms of the different types of mediation. These can 
be anticipated in planning and policy making, such that landscape design becomes 
more sensitive to the actual relations between people and their environment. We 
recommend further research by an extensive case study and an investigation of the 
way in which changes in the landscape mediate the relation between the designers 
themselves and the landscape. 
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